DO NO HARM RESEARCH
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Richard Eves,
with Genevieve Kouro,
Steven Simiha
and Irene Subalik
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<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<td>International Women’s Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
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<td>non-government organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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The Do No Harm Research
The project is a collaboration between Department of Pacific Affairs (formerly State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program) at the Australian National University and the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA). Richard Eves is the principal investigator, lead researcher and author of this report. The research team in Papua New Guinea comprised Richard Eves, Genevieve Kouro, Steven Simiha and Irene Subalik.

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Note on Names
Apart from the acknowledgements above, all names used in this report are pseudonyms.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, women’s economic empowerment has become an essential component of economic development programming. However, it is now known that improvement in women’s economic situation often comes with heavy unanticipated costs to women. Violence, in particular, is too often a by-product, as our research and that of others elsewhere have shown.

The Do No Harm (DNH) project addresses the question of how to improve women’s economic agency without compromising their safety and well-being. Drawing on primary qualitative research in Jiwaka and Chimbu provinces in Papua New Guinea, we report here on the links we have found between women’s income generating activities and an increased incidence of violence against them. At the same time, we report on other problems that have arisen due to a combination of changes in women’s economic status and more general changes in the culture.

Clearly, women’s economic empowerment programming must adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach, which seeks to limit the risk of violence. This requires that violence against women is a concern central to such programming. A ‘do no harm’ approach requires a thorough understanding of the context in which violence takes place — those factors that propel violence and those that have the potential to mitigate against it. This requires sound research from which bespoke gender programming that confronts the essential causes can be developed.

The women who participated in this study were mostly involved in the informal economy, selling garden produce or cooked food at markets, with only a few earning income by selling livestock or coffee. In this respect, women in Chimbu faced particularly difficult conditions, having to travel long distances and negotiate appalling road conditions to reach markets. Though our other participants, in Jiwaka, lived within easy reach of markets, their over-reliance on selling garden produce means that markets are saturated by the same products and sales are poor. Lack of access to larger, more viable markets is a critical constraint upon more entrepreneurial income generation, and so development programming that enables such access is vital. Also greatly needed are business development initiatives that develop women’s business and financial management skills and provide capital for women to establish micro-businesses.

Though the women of Jiwaka and Chimbu generally spoke positively about the benefits of earning an income, they also pointed to a multitude of difficulties they face. We found that the economic advancement that many women are achieving rarely translates into actual empowerment, because they are rarely able to negotiate a decrease in domestic workloads when they bring income — often the only income — into the household. These women endure extremely heavy work burdens for; besides working to earn income, most continue to bear the responsibility for the agricultural labour that ensures sufficient food for the family to eat and for the unpaid house and care work (such as carrying water and firewood to the house, cooking, cleaning and childcare). More than any other women interviewed during the entire DNH research, the women of Chimbu complained most about the heavy workload of income generation, which means they lack time for other duties, let alone for rest or relaxation. They also complained of tiredness and the physical toll that work takes on their bodies.

That this labour falls overwhelmingly on women reflects the powerful gender norms which relegate women to the domestic sphere and associated types of labour. Though women themselves are often imbued with the conservative gender norms that stipulate their responsibility for unpaid house and care work, husbands, in any case, can and do place considerable pressure on them to conform. At the same time, this serious imbalance of power enables many men to shirk the duties gender norms assign to them. The imbalance in workloads and the lack of support from their spouses were a recurring refrain from our respondents.

The extent to which women are involved in household decision-making varies. The belief that the husband should be the head of the household is commonly held in Chimbu and Jiwaka, indicating the extent to which
gender norms with negative outcomes for women are accepted by women themselves. Several women told of
domineering husbands who made most decisions and told their wives what to do, in detail. Cases of husbands
and wives discussing decisions together were rare compared with other DNH research sites, with few women
citing this as a valued aspect of their marriage.

The research found considerable variation in household financial decision-making. In Jiwaka, it was more
common for husbands and wives to manage their own earnings separately and joint income management was
less common. Many women preferred to control their earnings so that their husbands could not use pooled
money for their own discretionary spending. By contrast, men preferred to control their own income, not to
prevent their wives wasting it, but to be free to spend it for their own pleasure — on beer, tobacco, gambling
and other women. In Chimbu, money was more often pooled and decisions about expenditure sometimes
made jointly, but husbands often made such decisions alone. Indeed, in some cases, husbands seized the wife’s
income and controlled it, even when they had not themselves contributed any money at all to the household.

Women in Jiwaka and Chimbu have a high level of exposure to violence, more than found by DNH research in
Solomon Islands and Bougainville. The women of Jiwaka and Chimbu are not only subject to physical violence,
but to other forms of violence, including emotional and economic violence and controlling behaviours.

We were given several reasons why men react violently towards their wives, including sexual jealousy, infidelity,
refusing sex, talking too much and wives’ failure to satisfy their husbands’ expectations, such as not completing
their work or not doing it to their husband’s satisfaction.

Conflicts over money were common — usually due to husbands not contributing financially to the household
and husbands demanding money from their spouses. Several Chimbu women told us that their income
generating activities, especially their trips to market, are a source of conflict and violence. In Chimbu, husbands
beat their wives if they feel they are not working hard enough or have not made enough money at market.
If income generating activities interfere with women’s domestic and childcare responsibilities, some husbands
react violently, with several women indicating that being late home from market and not being able to fulfil their
domestic and childcare duties led to violence from their spouses. We found no such cases in Jiwaka.

Significantly, we found that women’s increased financial resources often enable men to reduce their own
contributions to the household, or even to contribute nothing at all. Husbands can use their money for their
own discretionary consumption (while continuing to enjoy the benefits of family life, including the food provided
by their wife). In such circumstances, women’s economic advancement means a large increase in their work
burden and is an underlying cause of conflict that leads to physical violence. As in other DNH research, the
most violence reported during the Papua New Guinea research was connected to men’s alcohol consumption.

The numerous reports of violence we heard confirm that when women bring economic resources into the
household, they do not inevitably become more empowered or suffer less violence. An important implication
of the research is that women’s economic empowerment programs should avoid minimalist initiatives — that
is, they should not aim simply to give women access to economic opportunities without any consideration of
gender and gender relations, especially the role of gender norms in marital relationships.

We also found that changes in marriage practices are having a negative impact on women in Jiwaka and Chimbu.
The exchange of bride price is today widely understood to be a simple property transaction, in which the wife
becomes the property of the husband, her purchaser. Husbands therefore consider themselves fully justified in
treating their wives domineeringly and violently. The exchange of bride price also has the effect of increasing
women’s work burden, since the bride price creates debts that must be repaid. Though such debts are meant
to be borne by both partners, the responsibility for repaying them often falls solely on the wife. Indeed, some
key informants spoke of bride price as a form of ‘imprisonment’ for women.
In the last decade, gender programs have put considerable effort into working with men, though less so in relation to women’s economic empowerment programming. Men often feel excluded from initiatives that seek to improve women’s access to economic resources and this can result in backlash, which is one reason why women’s economic empowerment programs need to embrace ways of working with men. However, a greater need exists beyond fear of backlash. The failure to recognise that women are not a separate category from men but are intimately bound in relations with them in the household weakens the empowerment potential of women’s economic empowerment programming. But, above all, women should not be considered a separate category from men in the community either. Concentrating on men and women separately fails to address the need for community cohesiveness — that is, it fails to grasp the opportunity to build a strong, constructive and cooperative community.

That women’s economic empowerment programming needs to be integrated more fully with community-based approaches that have a focus on violence against women is recognised internationally. Community-based gender transformative programs are based on the understanding that women’s ability to translate economic advancement into economic empowerment requires that norms which constrain and limit their agency and power must be addressed. After all, the normalisation of gender inequality and violence takes place within communities, which should therefore be the starting point for change. Community-based approaches recognise that violence against women is the community’s responsibility, not a problem of individual women. Successful changing of social norms requires paying special attention to working with key initiators of change in communities, including church leaders, village court officials and other leaders.

**Key Lesson — Working with Men is Necessary**

A major lesson to be drawn from the Do No Harm PNG research is the crucial importance of working with men.

Although good initiatives working with men already exist, an unfilled need remains for initiatives that are specifically relevant to women’s economic empowerment and that highlight a different range of issues. Programs should include financial management and decision-making in the household, domestic labour and other caring responsibilities, workloads and the benefits to men and children of more cooperative gender relations. Since women are often in agreement with their own oppressive gender norms, there is also a need for broader gender programming that addresses both men and women. It is now recognised internationally that women’s economic empowerment programming must be thoroughly integrated with community based approaches, including violence against women programs (Mejia et al. 2014; Taylor 2015).

**Key Lesson — The Need for Community-Based Gender Transformative Programs**

Women’s economic empowerment programming should embrace a fully comprehensive gender transformative approach.

Men are part of the community and a community-based approach addresses them as such rather than in isolation. It presents issues such as violence against women as the community’s responsibility, not as the problem of individual women (Michau 2007:104). However, evidence suggests that shifting understanding or individual attitudes is often not enough to shift behaviour. Since the constraints imposed by social and gender norms are beyond the level of the individual, a community-wide approach to change is essential. This must be firmly rooted in the specifics of each locality — its particular characteristics, its challenges, strengths, weaknesses, cultural norms and beliefs.
Key Lesson — Women’s Economic Empowerment Programming Needs to Adopt a ‘Do No Harm’ Approach.

To do no harm in working to promote women’s economic empowerment means ensuring that programs do not, at the very least, increase the maltreatment women suffer, mostly at the hands of their husbands.

A sound ‘do no harm’ approach is based on a thorough assessment of the local culture, especially its social norms, so that the risk of violence and other adversities is not actually increased due to women’s increased income.

Source: Richard Eves
PART 1. INTRODUCTION

This report covers the research undertaken in the Papua New Guinea highlands as part of the much larger project, Do No Harm: Understanding the Relationship between Women’s Economic Empowerment and Violence against Women in Melanesia. The Do No Harm (DNH) research addresses the question of how to improve women’s economic agency and the security of their livelihoods without compromising their safety. It sought to capture the diversity of ways that women endeavour to overcome economic disadvantage in contemporary Melanesia. Fieldwork for the Do No Harm research was undertaken in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, with a total of 485 interviews conducted, including 238 with women. The interviews generated a large body of rich qualitative data on women’s lives and the difficulties and challenges they confront as they seek to earn income in order to improve their lives and those of their children.

Women’s Economic Empowerment

Women’s economic empowerment is now widely seen as a critical component of development initiatives and poverty reduction (Kulb et al. 2016:715). For the last decade, aid donors, international development organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs) have taken up the cause of women’s economic marginalisation and poverty and have embraced their economic empowerment as the most effective approach to the problem. The Australian aid program, for example, places strong emphasis on addressing women’s empowerment and especially women’s economic empowerment (DFAT 2014:8, 16, 25; 2015). Australia’s Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, has stated that the empowerment of women and girls and increasing progress towards gender equality in our region is a key priority of Australia’s foreign policy and aid program (DFAT 2015:1). Most recently, this commitment has been set out in the Australian Government’s February 2016 document, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy, in which promoting women’s economic empowerment is one of three strategic objectives (DFAT 2016). Given this emphasis on women’s economic empowerment as a key objective of Australian aid, it is important to reflect on the processes of economic empowerment and especially the factors that may facilitate this objective, as well as any factors that may counteract it.

In this report, we make a distinction between women’s economic advancement and women’s economic empowerment (Buvinić and Furst-Nichols 2014:2; Taylor 2015:16). By women’s economic advancement we refer to women gaining increased income, access to employment and other activities that see their resources increased. Many programs claim to be working on women’s economic empowerment, but are actually much more narrowly focused on increasing women’s access to resources (Taylor 2015:16). For women’s economic empowerment we espouse the definition given in a recent Overseas Development Institute (ODI) report:

*Women’s economic empowerment is the process of achieving women’s equal access to and control over economic resources, and ensuring they can use them to exert increased control over other areas of their lives.*

(Hunt and Samman 2016:7; see also Taylor and Perezniego 2014)

This definition embraces the idea that women need to advance economically as part of their economic empowerment and that this requires an increase in women’s power and agency if it is to truly qualify as empowerment. Thus, women’s economic empowerment comprises two interrelated components: 1) economic advancement, and 2) increased power and agency, with both components being connected and necessary in order to achieve better lives for women and their families (Golla et al. 2011:4). Crucially, the concept of empowerment must be understood to include a process of social change towards greater equality and the agency we foster must be understood as a ‘transformative agency’ which can challenge and destabilise inequalities, rather than simply expressing and reproducing inequalities (Guérin et al. 2013:S90).
As Georgina Taylor argues, women’s economic advancement differs from economic empowerment because, ‘while women may be able to earn money and gain access to assets, they may not be able to retain control over economic choices if their power and agency and structures and social norms around gender equality remain unchanged’ (Taylor 2015:16). Economic advancement does not automatically result in economic empowerment or broader empowerment for women. This understanding is reinforced by the Overseas Development Institute report which says:

*there is no automatic ‘win-win’ between wider development outcomes and gender equality. While the latter is clearly good for growth, a gender equitable distribution of the economic gains of growth does not happen automatically … And growth does not necessarily translate into gains in women’s well-being.*

(Hunt and Samman 2016:7)

This suggests that it is necessary to integrate efforts to promote women’s economic advancement with approaches seeking to increase women’s power and transformative agency (Taylor 2015:19).

It is often assumed that improvement of women’s economic security through forms of economic advancement will automatically flow on to improvement in other dimensions of their lives but this fails to consider how the actual use of this income is affected by other forms of inequality in relationships (UNFPA 2007:11). Initially, some researchers believed that an increase in income would bring an improvement in bargaining power in the household and that this, in turn, would reduce the risk of intimate partner violence. Linda Mayoux, among others, has challenged this notion (see Mayoux 1999b:959; Vyas et al. 2015:35) for it has turned out that women’s economic empowerment initiatives sometimes bring unforeseen consequences. In fact, improving one dimension of women’s lives often undermines others (Haile et al. 2012:257).

In Papua New Guinea, women’s economic advancement often comes at increased costs to women, including violence and even greater work burdens, because they continue to be responsible for domestic labour within the household in addition to economic contributions. A considerable body of literature now discusses the impact of economic activity on women’s lives and on gender relations and identifies both positive and negative outcomes for women, including increases and decreases in levels of violence (Bradley 2011:9; Eves 2016c; Gammage et al. 2016:8; Haile et al. 2012:256; Haile et al. 2015; Kabeer 2016:315; Taylor 2015:10; Vyas and Watts 2009). The 2008 AusAID/Office of Development Effectiveness report, Violence against Women in Melanesia and East Timor: A Review of International Lessons, also found that while microfinance can sometimes strengthen women’s ability to stand up to family violence, ‘interventions aimed at empowering women can generate unintended consequences, often in the form of violent backlash. (As women increasingly demand equality, men increasingly assert their control over women)’ (AusAID ODE 2007:17 parentheses in original).

Several others have also observed that increased financial autonomy for women may simply mean that their husbands or partners opt out of contributing, or reduce their contributions to the household expenses so that women are forced to meet these shortfalls (Haile et al. 2012:257, 258). According to Mayoux: ‘There is considerable evidence that women’s increased control over income may be accompanied by a withdrawal of male contributions for their own luxury expenditure, limiting the total increase in income going into household wellbeing’ (Mayoux 1999a:2, 1999b:972, 2001:452; and see also Haile et al. 2012:257, 259; Miedema et al. 2016:683; Wrigley-Asante 2012:356; Vyas et al. 2015:48). Further, the observation has often been made that in developing countries poor women tend to spend the income they control largely on family needs rather than on personal needs (Agarwal 1997:25; Mayoux 1999b:969). Some researchers suggest that women typically put an average of 90 per cent of their earnings back into the family, compared to the 30–40 per cent that men contribute (Porter 2013:4).
The Research

The PNG component of the research, undertaken in April 2016, included fieldwork in three rural sites in the highlands: one in Jiwaka Province (Anglimp-South Wahgi District) and two in Chimbu Province (Kundiawa-Gembogl District).3 The research team completed 189 interviews (see Table 1).4

Table 1: Number of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Site</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Key Informant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiwaka</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimbu — Site 1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimbu — Site 2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53 (f – 1/1/m – 42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were recruited through local contacts working in community-based organisations with strong links to the particular community. As we were interested in women’s income generation, we sought to interview women who had a source of income. Therefore, in Jiwaka, we worked with a local partner of the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA), Voice for Change, mainly with respondents involved in their livelihoods programming. In Chimbu, we found respondents through partners of Oxfam, KGWAN at Site 1 and IRRM at Site 2, where Oxfam has a livelihoods program training people to grow brown onions as a cash crop.5 Both Voice for Change and Oxfam had at some stage undertaken gender awareness training, with the result that many of the respondents had some exposure to gender issues, including violence against women. This perhaps makes our respondents atypical for rural PNG, where contact with the work of NGOs is often limited and exposure to ideas about gender is sporadic. However, despite their exposure to ideas about gender, the experience of many of the women respondents was instructive because rates of violence remained high and women still suffered considerable disadvantage because they are women.

The research in Jiwaka and Chimbu focused on women’s involvement in the informal sector.6 As indicated below, women in PNG have a much lower level of labour force participation than men and the informal sector is the predominant arena for women’s engagement with the economy. The research gathered detailed accounts of women’s experiences as they attempted to overcome economic disadvantage. In-depth qualitative interviews were used to explore marital relationships, how the domestic economy is managed within the family and what gives rise to conflicts. The aim of the DNH research was to capture the individual experiences of women by encouraging them to tell stories of their lives from childhood to their present married life. This approach can produce rich case studies in which women’s voices are heard, voices that larger quantitative and generalisable studies are unable to attend to. Having women speak about the issues they confront in their daily lives enables a fuller appreciation of the realities of those lives, thus providing a good understanding of the factors that constrain or facilitate women’s economic advancement and empowerment.

Most of the women interviewed in Jiwaka and Chimbu were married, though a small number were widowed, divorced or separated. Table 2 gives some background demographic information on the respondents, including age range, how many had borne children and how many were with dependants.7
Table 2: Female respondent demographic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range (years)</th>
<th>19–67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of women who have borne children</td>
<td>86 (94.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of children per woman</td>
<td>1–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women with dependants</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of dependants per woman</td>
<td>1–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependants</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seventy-nine of 91 (86.8%) marriages had entailed the exchange of bride price. The largest amount of bride price was K20,000 (AUD8361) and 30 pigs and smallest was K300 (AUD125). The greatest number of pigs was 30 and the least was one. The number of marriages entailing the exchange of bride price is far greater than found in other DNH fieldwork. For example, less than 25 per cent (10/43) of Bougainville marriages involved bride price. Generally the sums exchanged in Bougainville were also much lower than in the highlands, ranging from K100 (AUD41) to K3000 (AUD1254), the latter also including some ‘traditional’ shell valuable (see Eves 2018).

The majority of the respondents belonged to the Catholic Church, followed by the Evangelical Brotherhood Church and the Nazarene Church, with small numbers belonging to various other denominations (see Table 3).

Table 3: Female respondent church affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church (affiliation)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Brotherhood Church (EBC)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazarene Church</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Church</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revival Centres of PNG</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Healing Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Outreach Centre (COC)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblies of God</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Square Gospel Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Life Centre (CLC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Government Revival Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Renewal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest Ministry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The women’s sources of income included elementary school teaching or filling roles in churches but the great majority were involved in the informal economy of selling garden produce or cooked food at markets. A few earned income by selling livestock (pigs and chickens) and some in Jiwaka earned money from coffee. Due to the limited opportunities for employment and low levels of educational attainment, this type of income generation is often the main means by which women earn money, which was also a finding of the other DNH research in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

Research Methodology

The research used in-depth qualitative interviews to explore the ways that people manage their marital relationship and their household economy and what gives rise to conflicts. Importantly, respondents were encouraged to tell stories of their lives from childhood to their present married life in order to capture their experiences as authentically and explicitly as possible.10 Though the aim of the research was primarily to capture women’s experiences, men were also interviewed to facilitate a better understanding of the range of beliefs, attitudes and norms that underpin gender inequitable behaviour.11

The research was guided by the following key questions:

1. What are the effects of women’s economic empowerment activities on gender and power relationships in the family?
2. What is the relationship between women’s economic empowerment and their experience of family violence?
3. What lessons can be drawn from the research in order to maximise the potential for positive gender equality outcomes?

These and a number of subsidiary questions were used as guides for interviewers in developing specific questions to ask in the individual in-depth interviews (see Interview Guide/Questions URL: http://ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-02/interview_guidequestions.pdf).

Semi-structured interviews with key informants were also undertaken to gather contextual information, particularly the cultural, economic and social factors affecting women’s income generating activities, as well as gender relations more broadly. These interviews used thematic guides rather than standard questionnaires to enable a free elicitation style that would encourage respondents to talk in detail about particular themes. The key informants included local leaders, such as village councillors, leaders of women’s organisations, village court officials and church pastors, recruited through leaders of the community-based organisations we worked with.

The scope and aim of this qualitative study is to capture and document the particular characteristics of each research site at a particular moment, to provide rich accounts of the contexts in which women in Papua New Guinea live their lives and the constraints and challenges they face in becoming economically empowered. Development practitioners increasingly acknowledge that an understanding of the context in any given region or country is absolutely vital to enable the most appropriate programming interventions to be devised (Alexander-Scott et al. 2016:21; Gendernet 2011:18; Hunt and Kasynathan 2001:47; Mosedale 2005:245). This applies particularly to violence prevention because, while violence against women is widespread globally, it is founded in each locality upon the specific social and gender norms and constructions of masculinity and femininity that exist there (Lockett and Bishop 2012:6). Given the importance of women’s economic empowerment to donors, NGOs, governments and women themselves, there is a critical need for research to provide a good understanding of the challenges to realising this goal and an evidence base from which development programming can proceed. Our research provides insights into the gendered power dynamics at play in marital relationships, the specific factors that act as barriers to women’s income generating activities and their economic empowerment, and the risk factors for violence.
As the focus of the research was marital relationships and the dynamics of households, we use the term intimate partner violence, rather than gender-based violence, since this can refer to violence outside the marital context. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), intimate partner violence is one of the most common forms of violence against women and includes physical, sexual and emotional abuse, and controlling behaviours by an intimate partner (WHO 2012:1). For the WHO, intimate partner violence includes:

- **Acts of physical violence**, such as slapping, hitting, kicking and beating.
- **Sexual violence**, including forced sexual intercourse and other forms of sexual coercion.
- **Emotional (psychological) abuse**, such as insults, belittling, constant humiliation, intimidation (e.g. destroying things), threats of harm, threats to take away children.
- **Controlling behaviours**, including isolating a person from family and friends; monitoring their movements; and restricting access to financial resources, employment, education or medical care. (WHO 2012:1)

The accounts of violence cited here mostly concern physical violence, which is generally how respondents defined violence, though it is clear from the accounts that the women of Jiwaka and Chimbu are subject to other forms of abuse, including emotional and economic violence and controlling behaviours.

**Papua New Guinea Context**

The issue of gender equality in Papua New Guinea presents a bleak picture for women; the United Nations Development Programme in 2014 gave the country a Gender Inequality Index (GII) figure of 0.61, ranking it 140 out of 155 countries (UNDP 2015a:226). Despite the Papua New Guinea constitution recognising the equality of men and women, women are severely disadvantaged compared to men. For example, women have:

- lower labour force participation than men (70.5% for women and 74% for men [aged 15 years and over]);
- less years of schooling (mean years of schooling 3.2 for women and 4.8 for men); and
- lower estimated per capita income (USD2145.50 for women and USD2767.70 for men) (UNDP 2015b).

At the time of the DNH fieldwork, women had very low political representation (three seats or 2.7%) in the national parliament but this was reduced to zero seats in the 2017 national election.

While men, too, may be excluded from the formal financial system, the situation for women is especially dire, with the Women’s World Banking study concluding that, ‘Papua New Guinea is a challenging place for women to start and grow businesses and to access financial services’ (Banthia et al. 2013:23). Reliable and up-to-date figures on financial inclusion in Papua New Guinea are rarely available, with most of the cited figures only being estimates. The excellent report of the Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme (PFIP), The Financial Competency of Low-Income Households in PNG, estimated financial exclusion to be as high as 80% (Sibley 2013:53). More recently, the Bank of Papua New Guinea estimated the number of account holders with formal financial institutions to be 435,316 out of a population of 5.38 million (cited in INA, WB and BPNG 2015:10). Financial exclusion is especially stark in the highlands region, with the Bank of Papua New Guinea putting the number of unbanked at 91.92% (BPNG 2013:8). In research among coffee smallholders in Eastern Highlands Province carried out as an adjunct to the DNH research, we found much higher levels of financial inclusion, with 25% having a household bank account (31/124, with 1 unanswered). Financial exclusion was greatest for women in the Eastern Highlands with only a small percentage — 6.6% (9/136) — having their own bank account.

Despite the popular view that Papua New Guinea has remained rooted in a past era, many changes have occurred, both during the colonial period and subsequently, that have had profound impacts on gender — Christianisation, Western education, exposure to modern media, labour migration and exposure to Western notions of human rights and gender equality. Some of these changes have influenced a shift in the cultural norms governing gender relations and led to more equitable relations between men and women, though the degree
of this varies across the country. Sometimes these changes have been negative for women and sometimes positive, and so progress towards gender equality is extremely variable.

Christian missionisation brought new ideas concerning gender, perhaps most notably a focus on the nuclear family as the basic unit of society, rather than the traditional extended family, typically organised around a ‘big man’ who gathered supporters around him. Some missions and churches have reinforced traditional notions of the husband as the head of the household, arguing for a hierarchy with God at the top, followed by men and then women. This places emphasis on the submission of women to their husbands. However, other missions and churches challenge the notion that women should be ‘slaves’ to men as a pastor in Chimbu indicated when he remarked that ‘meri i no inap stap slave bilong mipela (women should not be slaves to us)’. Some missions and churches see the relationship between husband and wife as a partnership that entails mutual cooperation and respect. This is sometimes expressed in terms of mutual submission, with the woman submitting to the husband and the husband submitting to the wife (‘meri i mas aninit long man and man i mas aninit long meri’) as one female key informant in Jiwaka expressed it. Sometimes this is still conceived as the husband being the final arbiter of decisions, but it is a significant improvement on the view that a wife should entirely submit to her husband, since it recognises at least that women should be consulted in decision-making. However, although some key informants enunciated the idea of mutual submission, this was less common among the female respondents. Far more common was the belief that a wife should submit to her husband, suggesting that women readily subscribe to oppressive gender norms.

Any decline in the more rigid norms and practices that keep women subservient has been patchy, and women continue to be far from equal partners with men. In reality, the prospect of gender equality remains a distant dream. Despite much talk about gender equality and considerable condemnation of violence against women, this antagonistic outlook and behaviour remains endemic in most parts of the country and entrenched ideas continue to be strong — for example, in many places, including the highland provinces of Jiwaka and Chimbu, the exchange of bride price is widely accepted as giving men the right to beat their wives (see pp. 25–26). Even when bride price has not been exchanged, men still believe that they are entitled to use violence against their intimate partners. Several scholars explain the high levels of violence against women in Papua New Guinea as due to men’s wish to maintain the existing unequal relations of power and the control that they wish to assert over women (Bradley 1985; Eves 2006; Josephides 1994; Macintyre 2012; Toft 1985; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2012). Some of the changes that have occurred in Papua New Guinea, such as the constitutional recognition of rights of equality, the availability of education and new career opportunities, have brought a new independence to some women, disturbing the traditional gender roles, but this has sometimes led to a male backlash. Indeed, some scholars have argued that male angst and confusion in the face of rapid change, including more rights and autonomy for women, has produced increased violence against women (see also AusAID ODE 2008:59–60; Taylor 2008).

Gender in the Highlands

The precolonial situation for women in the highlands is generally considered more extreme than in other parts of Papua New Guinea. An earlier generation of anthropologists characterised gender relations there as ‘sexual antagonism’ — that is, a fundamental opposition between male and female. This included a rigid role dichotomy, residential segregation, a strict division of labour, and distinct spheres of interpersonal life, experience and ritual activity (Herdt and Poole 1982:15; Read 1952, 1982). Men avoided women at certain times — such as prior to an important ceremony, the use of magic, warfare and hunting — because women, and especially their bodies and their menstrual blood, were considered antithetical and in some contexts dangerous to men (Reay 1959:162, 170–74; Nilles 1950/51:48–49). In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that negative views of women prevailed.
To some extent, the rigid dichotomisation of ‘sexual antagonism’ was challenged by pioneering women anthropologists who suggested that the picture was not so simple. They argued that elements of complementarity existed between men and women, particularly in the types of labour each performed (see Brown and Buchbinder 1976:4; Lederman 1986; Strathern 1972). The value of women lay in their capacity to produce and raise children and the wealth objects, such as pigs and garden food, that were used in exchanges and ceremonies where men could acquire prestige (Brown 1988:125; Brown and Buchbinder 1976:8). Marriage, together with the exchanges of wealth and the creation of relationships it involved, was an important pathway that allowed men to compete in contexts where they could gain prestige. Men were, thus, dependent on women and their labour without which their ambitions to become big men would be severely curtailed. Despite this, men rarely esteemed or respected women but regarded them as inferior beings to be managed for men’s benefit.

Land

In the highlands, gender norms interact with other social and cultural norms, such as those pertaining to land tenure and marriage, to disadvantage women. The land tenure system imposes constraints on women’s ownership of, and access to, the productive asset of land, which impacts negatively on their income generating opportunities. The highlands region is dominated by patrilineal land tenure systems, which position men as landowners and render women essentially landless. Having no access to land, this essential requirement for the production of livelihoods and income, is a major impediment for women. While a woman may have some use-rights to her father’s land, upon marriage she is expected to move to her husband’s land and then to use his land. Marriage does confer some use rights to a woman over her husband’s land, but women are at a disadvantage when it comes to accessing land which they control and from which they can secure the economic benefits of production. Because cash crops are planted on the husband’s land and he is considered its owner, he may monopolise the income from those cash crops, seeing it as exclusively his own, even though his wife has often done a major part of the work involved in their production (see also Eves and Titus 2017a, 2017b; and below p. 28). Generally, the kinds of secondary use rights that women have do not enable the planting of permanent cash crops but do afford the opportunity to plant annual crops such as vegetables, and women usually have the use of the small amounts of money they earn through selling these at markets. Women’s marginalisation from this key productive resource makes it difficult for women to escape violent relationships because there is no guarantee that if she returns to her natal village she will be granted access to land (see Eves 2017d). So, while a woman may return to her place of birth and reside there, with her father giving her use-rights to land, she is not necessarily assured of access following his death, since his land passes to his male children, her brothers.
PART 2. FINDINGS — CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1 — Jiwaka Province

In Jiwaka Province the research team worked with a partner organisation of IWDA, the local community-based organisation Voice for Change that recruited respondents for interview. Formally part of the Western Highland Province, Jiwaka was established as a new province in May 2012 and comprises three districts — Anglimp-South Wahgi, Jimi and North Wahgi.

Table 4 gives some background demographic information on the Jiwaka respondents, including age range, how many have borne children and how many have dependants.

Table 4: Female respondent demographic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range (years)</th>
<th>24–67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of women who have borne children</td>
<td>35 (97.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of children per woman</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children borne</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women with dependants</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of dependants per woman</td>
<td>1–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependants</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 indicates marital status, the numbers previously married and the numbers in polygynous marriages. Of the 36 women, 29 (80.6%) marriages entailed the exchange of bride price. The largest bride price was K20,000 and 30 pigs and smallest was K400. The greatest number of pigs was 30 and the least was one. One bride price payment included a cow and some included a cassowary.

Table 5: Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currently married</th>
<th>24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separated, divorced or abandoned</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number with previous marriages</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number currently in polygynous marriages</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages with bride price</td>
<td>29 (80.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 summarises respondents’ educational levels. Most had either no formal education or had attended primary school only. Some women’s schooling was interrupted by clan warfare which curtailed their movement, since in such circumstances any clan member at all is liable to be killed in payback for any deaths their clan caused among the enemy clan.
Table 6: Highest level of education attended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational/Technical</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7 shows, the majority of women interviewed in Jiwaka were members of the EBC (Evangelical Brotherhood Church), followed by the Nazarene Church. Many respondents were active in the community, filling roles such as Sunday school teacher, church worker, pastor, Voice for Change extension worker or youth worker.

Table 7: Church membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Name</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Brotherhood Church (EBC)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazarene Church</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Church</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Healing Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Renewal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest Ministry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 12 (33.3%) women had mobile phones. Seventeen (47.2%) women said that they had no bank account, four have their own bank account and 15 said they saved with Voice for Change. The Voice for Change savings scheme operates differently from the savings groups/clubs the DNH research examined in Solomon Islands (Eves and Lusby 2018). Although there are different models for savings groups, they are generally community based, require a membership fee and allow deposits and loans, though how much a person can borrow varies. The savings scheme of Voice for Change operates simply by allowing women to deposit their savings in a bank account operated by the organisation. It has some restrictions on withdrawals, which are permissible only in January and December. Withdrawals outside of these months means paying the bus fare for a Voice for Change staff member to travel to the bank in Mt Hagen. At one stage the total savings the organisation had amounted to K95,000.

Voice for Change has also been promoting livelihood training among its catchment. When the fieldwork was undertaken, eight extension officers were working to train people in the growing of vegetables for sale.

Women’s Income Sources and the Challenges of Income Generation

Two of the 36 interviewees did not earn any form of income, being fully engaged as deacons of the EBC. Two women were paid as church pastors, one with the Nazarene Church and one with the Salvation Army, the latter supplementing her income by selling garden produce. All the other women earned an income in the informal sector, something that is common to the other DNH research (Eves and Lusby 2018; Eves 2018). Twenty-eight of the women interviewed in Jiwaka earned money by selling fresh garden produce, such as sweet potato, onion, pumpkin, cucumber, cabbage, peanuts and fruit (unspecified). Four women said that they sold cooked food, three sold poultry and five sold pigs. Six women also earned money from coffee. Many had more than one source of income — for example, a woman may sell vegetables, pigs and coffee.
Women generally spoke positively about the benefits of being able to earn income, but this is not without negative aspects and they pointed to a multitude of difficulties in their income generation. Numerous women reported an increased workload and said that they could not rest properly and were subsequently tired and weak. Others highlighted aching bodies from too much work. For some, the work burden of income generation was magnified by distance to the roads where markets are located or to gardens in the mountains. Some women said it was difficult to get time to go to the market because there were so many household chores to be done and children to be cared for.

Much as found by our DNH research in Solomon Islands and Bougainville, the women observed complained that earning money comes with increased demands from relatives and affines (see Eves 2017a). One woman said she stopped selling at the market because when others from her social group saw her earning money, they asked her to contribute more for compensation and bride price payments. Sometimes the demands are for goods on ‘credit’, with the debts not being repaid. Several women mentioned that their income generating activities bring jealousy and gossip from other women.

Some women said marital problems and, especially, unsupportive husbands impacted on their ability to earn money. Some also said that tribal conflicts, especially if they have not been properly resolved, prevented women from moving freely to markets, for as noted above, they could be targeted as part of a payback for a death in an enemy group. One woman mentioned that sometimes the customers complain about the high prices at the market and arguments break out. These quickly escalate into brawls as everybody in the market gets drawn into the conflict and this sees stock destroyed and people injured.20

One problem several women highlighted was that they were not always able to sell their goods because too many women at the market were trying to sell the same thing. This means they sometimes have to stay much longer at the market and then their husbands are angry with them for being out late. Sometimes when they come home late from the market they have arguments with their spouses, who are suspicious of their movements (see also p. 27).

For other women, the challenges of income generation include a lack of capital to invest in the business, particularly where money is needed to build pens for poultry or piggery projects, or to purchase seeds for vegetable planting. One woman said that people steal from her gardens which means that she has less produce to sell and consequently her family do not earn enough money. Another woman said that the changing climate and weather is making gardening more difficult.

Workload and Gendered Division of Labour

The women of Jiwaka bear heavy workloads. Women bear the responsibility for the agricultural labour that ensures sufficient food is available to the household. In the past there was a clear gender division of labour in agricultural work, with men being responsible for the heavy garden labour of cutting down the large forest trees in new gardens and digging drains between garden beds, so that excess water runs off, as well as for building houses and supplying firewood. One key informant said that a few men still do the heavy labour of cutting large trees and digging trenches though sometimes men with more than one wife will concentrate on the new wife, so it is left to the other wife to do this kind of heavy labour. Today, women are doing the majority of agricultural labour; even including those kinds of labour that was previously the responsibility of men (see also Voice for Change 2013:36). Research in Solomon Islands also found this to be the case (Eves and Lusby 2018). There, our research found that some of the changes occurring in gender roles are largely due to men opting out of contributing labour to the household, so that some women are forced to perform forms of labour traditionally done by men. Unlike in the Solomons, in jiwaka this is not a case of gender norms being equitably renegotiated — when men also take on domestic and caring labour — but is women having to fill the gap made by men’s failure to contribute.
Several women respondents in Jiwaka complained about the fact that their husbands did not help them with the work in the garden. As one woman said, she does the gardening, raises and sells pigs, looks after the children and does the household chores while her husband ‘relaxes’. Some women complain about being exploited by their husbands and, in their anger, will use the expression ‘mipela i kago boi bilong yu’ (literally: we are your cargo boy). Key informants also pointed to the way in which men are opting out of work. As one key informant said:

Lots of men don’t have a way of making money. They just go and play cards or something like that but the wives think of their children going to school and the need for school fees, soap and clothes for the children and struggle to bring in income. The men need this money so that they can go and drink beer or play cards and they take the women’s money.

The typical husband today, as one village court official noted,

has lots of children and he doesn’t do any work and gives all the hard work to his wife, who will work to look after the children. She accumulates money to pay for school fees but the husband is a ‘bikhed man’ (wilful, arrogant) who just wanders around doing nothing with his friends and comes asking for money from his wife.

This man went on to say that the husband will respond by beating his wife if she refuses to give him money.

Women also bear the burden of responsibility for the unpaid house and care work (such as carrying water and firewood to the house, cooking, cleaning and childcare). Only two of the 36 women interviewed indicated that their husband did housework, with one woman saying that her husband helped her with household chores and another saying that when she is at the market selling things her husband cooks food for the family in the afternoon. The fact that domestic labour falls overwhelmingly on women reflects the gender norms which prescribe a particular gender division of labour and gender roles, relegating women to the domestic sphere and the types of labour associated with it.

There is considerable pressure to conform to gender norms and roles; women who breach those norms are subject to sanctions, sometimes entailing the use of physical violence by husbands (see Jewkes 2002). Two women indicated that domestic chores are a source of conflict. One respondent indicated that her husband gets enraged if she hasn’t performed domestic tasks such as washing his clothes and to placate him she submits to his will by washing them. Another respondent, Hope, indicated that she was beaten by her husband if she did not prepare food quickly for him (Text Box 5, p. 17). This was also found to be the case in other DNH research. The Bougainville component of the DNH research found many instances of men beating their wives because they had failed to do domestic labour or did not do it to their husband’s satisfaction (Eves 2018).

Women themselves often adhere to conservative gender norms that stipulate their responsibility for domestic labour. When asked what makes a good wife, many women gave responses indicating their support for women being responsible for domestic labour and childcare. These included: ‘a good wife helps her husband to do work, washes clothes for her husband’; ‘a good wife works in the house, looks after the children. She stays at home and doesn’t roam and submits to her husband. She also earns money to meet her family’s needs and shares food with children, family and neighbours’; ‘a good wife stays in the house and does the domestic chores, takes good care of the children, and budgets the household income well’. While several women said that a good husband helps the wife with her work, only one woman mentioned that a good husband helps with household work.
Household Decision-Making

Women are often marginalised from decision-making in households in Papua New Guinea (see Eves and Titus n.d.; Eves 2018), and the DNH research in Jiwaka also found this common there. Women’s lack of involvement in household decision-making is often taken to be an indication of their lack of power and agency in the household, and so when formulating indicators for empowerment, gender and development specialists have used participation in household decision-making as one key proxy for empowerment (see Hanmer and Klugman 2016:238–39; Kabeer 2012:17). As a result, decision-making is the form of agency appearing most frequently in efforts to measure empowerment (Kabeer 1999:445).

Household decision-making may occur in several different ways. At one end of the spectrum it may entail one spouse being responsible for most decisions, with this typically being the husband. At the other end, decision-making may be joint, with both parties cooperatively making decisions together. However, as Naila Kabeer has observed, ‘few cultures operate with starkly dichotomous distributions of power with men making all the decisions and women making none’ (1999:446). In fact, what is commonly found is a hierarchy of decision-making responsibilities which allocates some aspects to men as household heads and others to women (ibid.).

Our research in Jiwaka found some cases of men occupying the role of household head and being responsible for decision-making. This did not always extend to all decisions in a household and there was considerable variation. For example, one woman, married to a pastor, said that although he was the main decision-maker, sometimes they made decisions together. She described her husband as supportive and helpful, saying that they discussed matters together. Another woman commented that her husband made most decisions in the family, though they share decisions about the children. According to Jacinta (Text Box 1), her second husband is the main decision-maker in the household, though they share decisions about money. Some women considered that the husband should be the main decision-maker, indicating the extent to which gender norms that have negative outcomes for women are endorsed by women. One widow said that when her husband was alive she believed that a wife should submit to her husband’s will, and so he was the main decision-maker. She considered she had a good relationship with her husband and remarked that he treated her well. It should be noted, however, that if she had not submitted to her husband he might not have treated her well at all.

Text Box 1: Jacinta’s Story

Jacinta only completed grade 1 at school. She is married to her second husband and had three children with her first husband, who did not pay any bride price for her and did not give her money when they were married. Jacinta left her first husband when he married another woman against her objections, saying that he favoured the second wife and gave money only to her. Jacinta attacked the second wife and her husband with a bottle. Jacinta’s second husband has not paid bride price. She says he treats her well, he is not violent and sometimes helps with domestic chores. He is the main decision-maker in the household but they share decisions about money. The household has some irregular income when Jacinta’s husband has paid work, but mostly their income comes from her growing and selling garden produce (kaukau, coffee and vegetables) and pigs. Jacinta holds the money and she and her husband decide how it will be spent. They use their earnings to benefit their family, spending it on household and personal items like oil, clothing and education costs like school fees.
The husband being the main decision-maker in the household does not necessarily mean that he was harshly oppressive, as is clear from a number of cases cited above where women said they had a good relationship with their spouse. In one case, the husband appeared to be excessively dictatorial. Barbara (Text Box 2) said that her husband would tell her what she had to do during the day before going to work and she would follow his directions. Though this relationship was not characterised by physical violence, his reluctance to contribute fully to the household and the way he instructed his wife about spending money shows elements of economic violence. As in the case above, had this wife not been so submissive, the situation may have been worse. The absence of physical violence does not mean that other forms of violence are also absent. Neither does the absence of physical violence mean that power is absent from relationships.

Occasionally we found that the wife was the main decision-maker in the household, though this was usually because the husband had ceded this role because he was mostly absent. This was one woman’s explanation for why she was responsible for decisions in the household — her husband was always with other women.

Cases of husbands and wives discussing decisions together were rare compared with other DNH research, with only a few women in Jiwaka mentioning this as an important aspect of their marriage. In the DNH Bougainville research, for example, several women mentioned discussing issues with their spouses and emphasised that joint decision-making was seen as a marker of a good marriage and an ideal husband. Moreover, some male respondents in Bougainville saw joint decision-making as an attribute of an ideal husband and practised this themselves (Eves 2018).

Some women in Jiwaka took the absence of conflict and physical violence to be the measure of a good marriage and gave less value to involvement in decision-making. In part this was because they considered that their proper role as a wife involved submitting to their husband. However, in a few cases mutual decision-making was seen to be part of a good marriage. For example, a Jiwaka woman who said that she has a good marriage and that her husband respects her and treats her and their children well, said she and her husband make decisions together about land, disciplining children, health and education. Another woman who had been forced into marriage said that her violent husband used to make all the decisions but this year he has changed and they discuss matters together, though it is unclear why he is no longer violent. One woman, Bertha (Text Box 3), said that when she was married she and her husband made decisions together about the children’s health and education, commenting that her husband listened to her and followed what she said.

However, it should be noted that when a woman says there is joint decision-making it is hard to ascertain from the data whether this is only nominal and actually means the wife defers to her husband’s wishes, something that was apparent in the DNH Bougainville research. Certainly, in a context where a husband sees his role as the head of the family and the wife believes that she must submit to her husband, this is likely to be the case.

Text Box 2: Barbara’s Story

Barbara is a 50-year-old woman with two children and three dependants. Her husband worked in the local health centre but left the family two years ago to go to Port Moresby and has not returned. He was not a violent man and Barbara never fought with him. He was the head of the family and before he went to work he would tell her what she had to do during the day and she would follow his directions. They both made decisions about children and resources, though he never told her how he spent his money. She complained about not knowing what her husband did with his money but eventually resigned herself to this. Sometimes he would give her money and tell her how she had to spend it. Now that she has been abandoned by her husband she controls her own money and spends it on her children and dependants.
In the patrilineal systems of the highlands, land is the property of men who almost exclusively make decisions about the use of land, though cases exist where men and women jointly make decisions about land. For example, one woman with a violent husband said that she and her husband both make decisions about land but that decisions about health and education are made by her. There are also cases where women alone are responsible for decisions about land, though this is mainly because they are responsible for planting the food that is the basis of the household’s subsistence.

Cases where more unusual aspects of household decision-making were allotted between spouses were not common. One woman, Laura (Text Box 4), has a fair degree of agency when it comes to financial decisions about how her income is spent, but she is subject to controlling behaviour and financial abuse in that her husband shares only a small part of his earnings with her.

Text Box 3: Bertha’s Story

Bertha was brought up in a polygynous family and her father had three wives. Her father did not treat her mother well, favouring his other wives. Bertha completed grade 8 and was selected to go to high school, but couldn’t complete high school because of school fees. Bertha married a man who was older than she. They practised joint decision-making, though she was responsible for decisions about money and things for the home. Bertha said that her husband listened to her and followed what she said. She admitted that sometimes she got angry with him. She would hit him and his relatives would come and beat her up. Their relationship soured when he would visit his previous wife and buy her things and she responded by stabbing him in the waist. Bertha had to pay compensation of K200 and has since divorced her husband.

Text Box 4: Laura’s Story

Laura grew up in a polygynous household, her father having two wives. She was the last of four children and was beaten by her father and his second wife. Although Laura attended school for a time, her schooling was interrupted as a tribal fight broke out between two clans near where the school was located. Laura’s marriage was arranged and the bride price was K6000 and 21 pigs, as well as some clothes and household items for herself. She believes her husband treats her well because he does not beat her and gives her some money. However, Laura’s husband controls her movements and does not allow her to walk about with others or go to market. Her husband earns an income from a job away from the home and he does not help Laura with the garden. Apart from giving her a little money, he mostly spends his income on himself. Laura is responsible for the gardening, looking after the pigs and her husband and children. She also looks after the children of her husband’s brother and feels overburdened with work. Laura’s husband makes decisions about health, education, land and the disciplining of children, while she makes decisions about gardening, coffee and giving food to others. Laura’s main source of income is coffee, pigs and selling garden produce at the market and she decides how it will be spent. Despite being overburdened by work, for Laura a good wife stays in the house and does the domestic chores, takes good care of the children and budgets the household income well.
Financial Decision-making

There are two main types of decision-making in regard to financial matters: ‘household income management’ and ‘independent income management’ (Kabeer 1997:273; see Eves 2018; Eves and Lusby 2018; Eves and Titus n.d.). In the first type, the husband and wife contribute their earnings to a common pool. In the second type, the husband and wife manage their own earnings separately, but whether they both contribute to the household expenses or take responsibility for particular household expenses varies.

Household Income Management

Household income management was less common among the Jiwaka respondents. In the few cases where it did occur the income was usually in the control of the husband but decisions about its use were made by both spouses. In some cases, decisions about financial matters were joint but the husband mainly made other decisions. For example, one woman mentioned above said that her husband made most of the decisions in the family but they both make decisions about the children and her husband takes care of the money, depositing savings in his BSP (Bank South Pacific) account. Decisions about how the money is spent are made together and her husband gives her money to meet household needs. Sometimes she spends her earnings on what she likes, though usually on family needs. A similar arrangement is in place for another woman who gives her earnings to her husband to deposit in their savings account, to which only he has access. They both make decisions about how the money is to be spent, which is for the benefit of the family and includes such things as their children’s school fees, bus fares, food and piglets to raise for sale. However, if she wants to spend some of their money she has to seek her husband’s permission.

Occasionally, in relationships where the husband is the primary decision-maker there is more equity in decisions about money. We also found cases where the control of the household income was in the hands of the woman. For example, one woman, Jacinta (Text Box 1, p. 13), said that her husband was the main decision-maker but she shared decisions with him when it came to money. In this marriage, she holds the money but she and her husband decide together how it will be spent, which is for the benefit of the family.

In some cases while financial decisions may be joint, other areas of decision-making may be the responsibility of one spouse. For instance, one woman told us she and husband made joint decisions about expenditure, but that she was responsible for decisions about health, education and discipline of the children. She indicated that they sit down together and make decisions about their joint income but she holds most of the money because her husband, who is a drinker, will spend it on alcohol if he has it. To avoid him getting control of her money she saves it in the Voice for Change account.

Independent Income Management

Independent income management was common in Jiwaka, with the husband and wife managing their own earnings separately, though the reasons for doing this differ between men and women. Several of the women controlled the money they earned, largely so that their husbands could not use pooled money for their own discretionary spending. This was the case with a woman, who, although she said her husband was the main decision-maker in the household, makes decisions about financial resources, driven in part by his wasteful and unnecessary spending, such as playing ‘lucky’, a type of card game.

One woman in a polygynous household said that she is in charge of the money she earns and decides how it will be spent, saying that it benefits her own family and those of her siblings, as she helps their children with school expenses.

By contrast, men’s control of their own income was not to prevent their wives wasting it, but rather so they could spend it on their own discretionary spending. The husband of Barbara (Text Box 2, p. 14), who told her what to do during the day before he went to work, largely controlled his income though they both made decisions about the children. Despite complaining about this, she eventually resigned herself to not knowing what he did with his money. Occasionally, he would give her money and, as indicated above, would tell her how to spend it.
That a woman is able to control her income does not necessarily mean her life is free from physical violence. While women may have a degree of positive agency, as evidenced by their involvement in financial decision-making, their agency in regard to other aspects of their relationship may be eroded by violence. One woman whose husband beats her when he drinks makes independent decisions about how to spend the money she earns. Another woman from Jiwaka, Hope (Text Box 5), said that she makes decisions about the money she earns but that her husband beats her if she fails to fulfill certain household duties promptly and for other reasons. She is also harassed by her husband and his sisters who demand money from her and gossip about her. Thus, while this woman had advanced economically, since she has income and controls it, this has not flowed on to other forms of power in the relationship and she remains subject to physical violence and bullying behaviour. Another woman in a polygynous marriage said she made decisions about the money she earned, which she saved with Voice for Change, although her husband made most of the household decisions. In part, her control of money was due to her husband’s past problems with drinking and giving her money to his first wife. Previously, when he returned home drunk, violent confrontations would ensue with him destroying property in the house. She would attack him with a stick and he would fight back and punch her.

**Text Box 5: Hope’s Story**

Hope comes from a polygynous family in which her father had seven wives and used to beat her mother if she asked him for money. She was in a relationship with her husband before she married, with the bride price being K6000 and 20 pigs. Hope’s husband is responsible for decisions about money and land, but she decides how she will spend the money she earns. She currently keeps her money buried in the ground, but is now planning to save with Voice for Change. Hope’s husband is verbally violent and beats her for not preparing food quickly and for issues related to the election. She is also harassed by her husband and his sister for money which they borrow and do not repay, and responds to their bullying by keeping her distance.

Although polygyny is discussed more fully below, the Jiwaka research shows that the dynamics of households change if a man takes another wife and the control of money and decision-making about money is likely to change, leading to resentment in the displaced wife (or wives). This occurred with Rachel (Text Box 6, p. 18), who said her relationship with her husband changed when he married another woman and he became violent towards her. Now he does not share any of his income with her. Although Rachel’s relationship with her husband improved somewhat after she went to the police, he is still violent. Now she keeps control of her own money and decides how it will be spent, though her husband makes most other decisions in the household.

A shift in financial decision-making is also evident in the case of Rose (Text Box 7, p. 18), whose violent husband refused to contribute money to the family but stopped being violent after their son intervened. He is now more respectful of his wife and they make most decisions about money jointly. However, Rose holds the money she earns and saves in the Voice for Change account.

In some cases, change in financial decision-making over time can see a move from joint decision-making to one in which each spouse decides on their own income. One respondent, Laura (see Text Box 4, p. 15), whose husband subjected her to controlling behaviour considered him good because he did not beat her and gave her some of his money. In the past, when she earned an income by working at a trade store and selling chickens, she and her husband decided together how her money would be spent. Today, however, she decides how her income will be spent and her husband, decides how his is spent, though he mainly spends it on himself.
For some, financial decision-making is a complex blend of household income management and independent income management. For example, the respondent above who said she has a good marriage recounted more complex decision-making when it came to money. Although the family’s main source of income is her garden produce sold at the market, she has to ask her husband’s permission to spend money to benefit her family. However, she also saves money with Voice for Change and has sole access to this money. When her husband earns money he does not consult with her about how he spends it, but she indicated that he spends it to benefit the family as ‘he knows the needs of the family’.

The complexity of income management is evident in the case of Michelle (Text Box 8) who says she has a good relationship with her husband but that he doesn’t share his money with her or help her with domestic, gardening or marketing work. Like many women interviewed in Jiwaka and Chimbu, Michelle defined violence mainly in physical terms, so she described her marriage as good because physical violence is absent. However, she is subjected to economic and emotional violence. The fact that her husband fails to contribute financially to the household is a form of economic abuse, which contributes to the precariousness of the household and puts pressure on her to meet the household needs and inevitably means she is overworked.
In some cases, the husband wants to be involved in decisions about income considered to be household, particularly those deriving from resources that belong to the man, such as coffee. For example, the man who left household decision-making to his wife because he spent his time with other women, wanted to be involved in decision-making with his wife about the coffee income. She was careful though to keep her own income firmly under her control. As is noted later, men believe that coffee income is greater than income from other sources, such as market vending, and since it is grown on their land they see themselves as entitled to it, even if they contribute little or no labour to its production (see p. 8; Eves and Titus n.d., 2017a, 2017d).24

Some husbands give their wives money but tell them how they should spend it and others trust their wives to spend the money prudently. For example, one husband who previously beat his wife when she didn’t give him money, and who was taken to court by her, now leaves her alone and trusts her to know how to spend the money. This woman admitted that she used to misuse money (though she did not specify how) but after attending a financial management course with Voice for Change, she now budgets and saves.

One respondent, Rena (Text Box 9, p. 20), recounted that her husband used to beat her and refused give her any money but changed when she gave birth to a child and he now contributes to the family. However, though Rena controls the money she earns and her husband controls the money he earns, they jointly discuss how to spend the money.

In some of the other DNH research, the extent to which women value financial autonomy varies. For example, women respondents in the Bougainville research generally considered having autonomy over their earnings less important than joint decision-making over money because, as noted above, they saw joint decision-making as a sign of a good marriage. This appears to conflict with the idea, often promoted by women’s economic empowerment programming, that women’s financial control of their own resources is a way of breaking dependency on husbands. In this view, if the marriage is violent these women have the financial resources to leave the relationship. However, the reality for women in Jiwaka is that earning an income does not necessarily remove financial dependency from men, since the income women make is usually obtained from a resource that is ultimately owned by the husband — land. As noted above, land is almost always in the hands of men, and even if a woman returns to her natal village, she is dependent on the goodwill of her father of brothers for access to enough land to secure her livelihood — and this is not always forthcoming (see p. 32 and Eves 2017d).
Marriage, Polygyny and Bride Price

While key informants spoke of the decline of tradition or ‘pasin bilong tumbuna’ as it is called in Tok Pisin, they said that marriage customs remain strong (kastam bilong marit i strongpela). However, the marriage customs of today are different from those of the past and there have been a number of significant changes, especially changes to the magnitude and meaning of the exchanges that mark marriage and the expansion of polygyny. Such changes have had important ramifications for women and in some cases women are worse off.25

Polygyny

Polygyny, referred to as ‘dubal marit’ (double marriage) in Tok Pisin, was a precolonial practice among the peoples of Jiwaka.26 Most men aspired to polygyny, according to the anthropologist Marie Reay, who undertook 15 months fieldwork, from November 1953 to March 1955, in what is today Anglimp-South Wahgi. Reay said that nearly every man hoped to have at least two wives but the goal was to have 10 wives, which she says was the largest number that can be indicated by a single gesture using both hands. Polygynists were admired and a man with three or more wives was judged to be important and wealthy (Reay 1959:82–84, 114; see also Reay 2014:13, 35).

Despite many men aspiring to achieve polygynous unions in the past, this was really the preserve of leaders with wealth, who sought to increase their renown (‘kisim bik nem’) by the practice (see also Voice for Change 2013:47).27 Such men had sufficient land to marry a number of wives and could increase their wealth through the labour of these wives. Such wealth was then used in ritual exchanges to increase their stature in the community. While polygyny today continues to be a practice of men with money, with one respondent commenting that: ‘Man i got planti moni, i got planti meri (a man with plenty of money, has got plenty of wives),’ it appears that some men are little interested in increasing their renown through a single gesture using both hands. Polygynists were admired and a man with three or more wives was judged to be important and wealthy (Reay 1959:82–84, 114; see also Reay 2014:13, 35).

One dimension of polygyny today is a preference for underage girls, with informants saying that one polygynous man would only marry girls less than 19 years old.28 A key informant gave the example of a polygynous man, referred to as ‘The Boss’, who was formerly a pastor with the EBC, but is now a successful business man with about twenty wives, several of whom are underage, the youngest being 12 years old. ‘The Boss’ justifies his
polygyny by recourse to the biblical story of King Solomon. He aspires to have as many wives as Solomon and says 'I haven’t married this many yet, but I will marry this many (mi no maritim iet, tasol bai mi maritim)'. Because he is rich and powerful, members of the community are too afraid to question his behaviour even though they disagree with it.

In the past, a husband would consult his existing wife or wives about marrying another wife, but today men generally do not do so and sometimes the first wife will only become aware of it when her husband brings a new woman home. This causes resentment, anger and, in some instances, violence. One male respondent said that some first wives agree to their husband having a second wife if they have not been able to bear children, though he said only a few women do this.

The increase in polygyny has resulted in the first wife often being abandoned, or ‘dropped’ as one woman remarked, and the husband not taking any responsibility for the household or the children from the first marriage (see also Voice for Change 2013:48–49). All the financial responsibility entailed in looking after children, such as feeding, clothing and meeting their health and education expenses, then falls to the first wife. Not only does this place enormous strain on her, particularly if she has several children, but in some cases the children are unable to attend school because their mother cannot afford the expenses. A significant volume of the case load of Voice for Change is concerned with managing the negative impacts of polygyny on women. According to Lilly Be’Soer, 70 per cent of the women who seek assistance from Voice for Change are there because their husbands do not share resources with their wives or take responsibility for their children. A key informant described the contemporary situation as follows:

There is a trend in the highlands region for men to want to be married to two or three wives — polygyny. The married couple are living happily together and they have children, but the man meets another woman and he starts to think differently. He brings this new woman home and forgets about his first wife and his children. Polygynous marriages give rise to lots of fights.

Sometimes husbands will resort to violence or ill-treatment in an effort to drive the first wife away (see also Voice for Change 2013:33). This is how one key informant described it:

If a man finds another woman he will sometimes make false allegations against his wife’s fidelity as a pretext for beating her. Such men will say: ‘You go to the market, but where is your money? You are going with another man, you go to the market and you must eat with another man, because you don’t give me any money.’ The real situation is that he has seen another woman or has befriended another woman secretly and he is using his wife’s alleged infidelity as an excuse to beat her. Some smart women will realise what is occurring and accuse him of beating her for no reason. Lots of time when a man beats his wife, she will run away to her natal village and then the new wife will come and live with him.

Nine women reported that there was violence of some kind in the context of polygynous marriages. This included violence by the husband against the wife, violence from the husband and co-wife against another wife, violence from a co-wife or co-wives against another wife and violence from female respondents towards husbands or co-wives. One woman who said she had a good marriage until her husband met another woman reported that he attacked her and broke her nose because he wanted to marry this woman, and they argued over it. As noted above, Rachel (Text Box 6, p. 18) also reported that she had a good relationship with her husband, who was not violent and supported the family financially until he took a second wife. Four respondents had been subject to violence from both husbands and co-wives. For example, one respondent reported that her husband favoured his second wife and the two of them beat her, also refusing to share any money with her. Two women were subject to violence from a co-wife or co-wives. One woman said that her husband’s
other wives fought with her using a bow and arrow and a spear. One woman who is now divorced stabbed her husband in the waist for buying things for his new wife. At other times when she had been violent towards her husband, his relatives responded by beating her up. Another woman, Jacinta (Text Box 1, p. 13), in a polygamous marriage said that her husband took another wife against her objections and subsequently favoured the new wife, giving her money. She responded by attacking the new wife and her husband.

First wives, in particular, object to their husband taking on new wives and may express their anger in physical violence, especially if the husband gives preferential treatment to the new wife, as often occurs. A new wife, too, may resort to violence if the husband continues to have intimate relations with the first wife. Indeed, one woman recounted that when her husband took another wife, the new wife lay in wait one night and stabbed her with a knife. She spent three weeks in hospital with a punctured lung and needed several stitches in her stomach. Following the attack, the second wife ran away to Chimbu and the clan of the first wife sought compensation for the attack from the husband and he was forced to pay K1300 and some pigs in compensation.

Some men engage in conscious strategies to minimise conflict between co-wives. A village court magistrate in Jiwaka Province said that when a man wants to take another wife he will initially have her living some distance from his first wife. Once this wife has come to accept the situation, he will move her much closer. This strategy was common in the past, for as one key informant related, her father told her that if a man decided to take another wife he would never bring her face to face with the first wife and the new wife would initially stay away from the territory of the wife. It would take time for the established wife to get used to the idea of another wife and there needed to be signs that she was willing to accept the other wife. The strategy of having a new wife live some distance from the first wife may diffuse potential violence but it still has negative implications for the first wife. Almost inevitably, the husband directs his emotional attention and his financial resources to the new wife and away from the first wife and her children. This puts further pressure on the first wife to meet household needs and increases her work burden.

Traditionally, domestic discord between co-wives was also mitigated by maintaining equity among the wives. A number of key informants indicated that, ideally, men with polygynous households should have separate houses, pig pens and gardens for each wife in order to avoid provoking the wives and keeping harmony among them. One polygynous man whose father was also polygynous recounted that his father avoided conflict by making sure that he treated them equally. If he purchased store goods, he would make sure that he would purchase seven items all of the same size or volume for his seven wives. Rather than give them the purchased goods individually he would bring the wives together so that they would see that they were each getting exactly the same item. Some men initially embrace the strategy of equity but gradually cease the practice. For example, a man may build a new house for another wife but not necessarily replace it when it starts to deteriorate. Overall, the tendency is not to treat wives equitably and if one wife is treated as a favourite by the husband this is often the cause of anger and resentment.

Some women respond to their husbands taking another wife by going on ‘strike’. One woman, for example, recounted how when her husband took a second wife she ignored him and only slept with him on one night afterwards. If their husband neglects them, other wives may take him to the village court. A village court official gave an account of a woman, whose husband was a business man with a total of six wives, taking her husband to the village court because he didn’t look after her well. The village court gave him a fine of K5000, a substantial amount for Papua New Guinea.

**Bride Price**

As indicated above, a large proportion (80.6%) of the marriages of the female respondents interviewed during the research entailed the exchange of bride price. In the wake of European contact in Jiwaka, there have been changes in the nature of the exchanges that accompany marriage and today the exchange is simply referred to as ‘braed prais’ (bride price). The kinds of items exchanged, the amount of wealth exchanged and the structure
and form of the exchanges have all changed. So, while men may invoke notions of ‘tradition’ or kastam, as a justification for the continued practice of bride price, it is a tradition that has been refashioned.

In the past, the number and type of items exchanged varied depending on the wealth of the bridegroom, but altogether the exchange was quite small compared with today’s standards. For a man of wealth, the objects included some ropes of small cowrie shells, a parcel of native salt and from one to four Bird of Paradise plumes, together with a pig, but a poor man would simply kill a pig and present it to the bride’s relatives (Reay 1959:98). Marie Reay says that soon after the arrival of Europeans, opportunities for greater displays of wealth arose and this increased the volume and the scope of what was exchanged (ibid.). A poor man was now expected to give at least four Bird of Paradise plumes, from two to four headdresses (made of less valued feathers), at least four goldlip shells, two bailer shells and several headbands of tambu shell (ibid.:99). More generally, Reay says that a marriage payment consisted of 15 to 20 plumes, a dozen or so headdresses (made of less valued feathers), from 10 to 20 or so goldlip shells, about half a dozen bailer shells, from 10 to 20 headbands of tambu shell, one or two skins of furred animals (such as possum, tree kangaroo, wallaby or other small animals), various shell and feather ornaments of less value and a steel hatchet or bush knife or both (ibid.). Marriage exchanges were always accompanied by the exchange of pig, which was generally a single pig, though a wealthy man arranging his own or his children’s marriages may exchange two or even three pigs (ibid.:102).

Almost all of the items that were used in marriage exchanges have now been displaced, with only pigs continuing to be of import in exchanges today. Now the main item of exchange for a marriage is money, which for our respondents could be as high as K20,000, though much higher figures are also known to have been paid elsewhere in Jiwaka. Indeed, marriage is increasingly being used as a competitive arena in which men vie with each other to see who can pay the most for a bride and this is leading to an inflation in the amounts exchanged (see also Voice for Change 2013:45). As one key informant explained:

_There is a competitive spirit amongst families and ‘hauslain’ which means people compete over how much they spend on bride price for women. If a man has a lot of money he will spend more than K10,000 and if a business man more than K100,000. Men compete to see how much they can spend on buying a wife, which isn’t good._

The inflation of bride price is having a number of consequences, including the marginalisation of men who cannot afford to compete, so that marriage becomes the preserve of the wealthy or of men who can draw on the support of others who have wealth. This is leading young men without the necessary resources or support structures to feel alienated from and resentful towards society. The inflation of bride price also has negative consequences for the women themselves, since the exchange entails creating debts that must be repaid at a later stage, with the onus often falling on women themselves (see below).

Generally, a series of exchanges accompany a marriage. In the past, this comprised a first payment to seal the betrothal followed later by the main marriage payment that comprised an exchange of valuables between two clans (Reay 1959:98–99). This wealth was given for the bride but her relatives were obliged to make a return payment of similar valuables, as well as another woman in exchange for her (ibid.:99). Exchanges were supposed to continue throughout the marriage, especially upon the birth of children and the debts accrued were finally settled at death (ibid.:101). Marriage exchanges were, thus, not simply a transfer of a bride from her clan to another clan on payment of valuables but a series of reciprocal exchanges that took place over a lifetime. Today, however, this more complex cycle of exchanges is being replaced with a far more simplified version, which simply entails the exchange of money and other items in return for the bride.
Bride Price and Commodification

A further change is that exchanges accompanying marriages are increasingly seen through the lens of commodification as shown by the common way of referring to marriage today, which is ‘baim meri’ (buying a woman/wife). This reinforces the now common belief that a woman becomes the property of the husband upon marriage. Having purchased (baim pinis) a woman, a man believes he owns her, as though she is little more than an object (Eves 2006:27; see Lewis et al. 2007:121; Voice for Change 2013:45–46). It appears that under various modern influences, perhaps especially the commodification of exchange, the traditional significance of bride price has been eroded and largely forgotten, a simplified version taking its place. Rather than being seen as an exchange which creates a relationship between two social groupings, and the bride’s kin being compensated for her loss, the bride price exchange is now widely understood quite literally as a simple property transaction, in which a woman becomes the property of a man. Just as a man purchases a commodity from a store, he purchases his wife from her parents.36

Bride price is now seen as vesting the husband with control over the wife. At its simplest the expression ‘bossim’ (to control or boss) is used but sometimes a man will say to his wife that she is under his control: ‘you’re under my control (yu stap aninit long kontrol bilong mi)’ or ‘your life is in my hands (laip bilong yu i stap long han bilong mi)’ which literally says that the woman’s very existence depends on her husband’s goodwill.

Sometimes the expression ‘full price, full body (full prais, full bodi)’ is used, meaning that since the full bride price requested by the wife’s group was paid, so the husband has complete control of the wife’s body. Another way of validating a husband’s full control over his wife is to say that because a full payment has been made he is entitled to all of her body (Olgeta bodi bilong em, mi ful payment). Men also say that bride price entitles them to total control over their wives, ‘from their feet to the hair on their head (long lek inap long gras pinis)’. Or a man may say, ‘I control my wife from head-to-toe (mi bossim meri long lek i go long hed)’. When men speak in terms of complete control over their wife’s body, they also mean that they consider that they are entitled to sexual access to their wife regardless of her consent.

Thus, the payment of bride price is used to justify the husband’s authority over his wife, entitling him to her labour, her sexual services and her full obedience (Bradley 1985:34). Put bluntly, the husband’s underlying and general objection is to virtually any exercise of agency on the part of his wife.

Bride Price and Violence

What is at issue is the gendered relations of power; it appears that the commodification of women has intensified the traditional authority that men have held over women — or at the least, has provided a justification for it that is suited to modern conditions. Further, it has the logical consequence of legitimating intimate partner violence, since having authority means exercising authority and, ultimately in the PNG context, using punitive means to enforce it.

A common response by a husband to justify the violence he uses against his wife is the refrain: ‘mi baim em pinis (I have paid for her)’. The bride price is actually paid by the husband’s group — that is, by his sub-clan. Any attempt by a wife to escape a violent or dysfunctional marriage will also be met with a similar refrain, the husband saying that he has expended a lot of money and pigs in purchasing his wife, and so the situation should remain as it is. For example, a human rights defender told how, when she accompanied a female teacher (from a school in Jiwaka) to the police station to lodge a complaint against the teacher’s husband for beating her, when brought into custody the husband said, ‘I paid bride price, a large amount of bride price, so I have the right to beat her (Mi baim braed prais, bikpela braed prais. Mi got rait long paitim em, em i tok)’.37 This defence is also resorted to by members of a husband’s family.

Under such circumstances violence is considered an entirely appropriate corrective for even the slightest failure of wives to fulfil their perceived marital duties and to observe customary proprieties. As one key informant noted:
It is the custom of us highlanders to buy wives with a large amount of bride price. Ok, when we buy a wife we think that we have paid for the body of the woman from the toe-to-head. Because a man has paid bride price he thinks that the wife is under his control. Men think like this. So when a husband asks his wife to do some work in the garden or something else and she avoids this and does what she likes and goes off to play cards, he will ask her what she has been doing. ‘You have work in the house and wander off doing your own thing.’ They will then start to fight.

Bride Price and Indebtedness

The large escalation in bride price, including the large amounts of cash seen today, is having another adverse effect on women. There is an expectation that a wife will contribute to the repayment of what is in fact her own bride price and she often suffers ill consequences if she does not work hard to do so.

Usually it is not the husband alone who accumulates the amount to be paid in bride price, even though husbands often speak as if they alone provided the wealth that was exchanged. Rather, contributions are made by other members of his immediate and extended family (hauslain) and these are recorded in detail. Such contributions are not freely given, magnanimous gestures. On the contrary, they are given in the full expectation that they will be repaid (bekim bek) later when the contributors have their own obligations to fulfill. In effect, contributions to a bride price payment actually create debts (dinau) between the married couple and all those who have contributed. This is explained in the following way by a key informant:

Lots of men will think that because they have paid bride price for a woman, she must work hard looking after pigs, making money. Because my brothers have helped me with the bride price, my hauslain has helped me with paying for the bride, the two of us must work hard to raise enough money and pigs to reciprocate — to repay the debt. A man who has helped me to buy a wife puts a debt on me. Whoever has helped me by giving money, whoever has helped me by giving me pigs, I write down their name and how much money or pigs. The both of us, me and my wife, will work hard to try to pay off this debt. If I do not reciprocate the things that were contributed to the bride price, if we do not reciprocate those things, people will gossip. … If the both of us do not pay off the debt, people will refer to us as rubbish. People will give us a bad name. That is why we work hard to reciprocate the things people have contributed to the bride price.

This quotation speaks clearly of the debts as being the responsibility of both the husband and the wife to repay. Therefore, if a husband feels that he is working hard to repay the debts but his wife is not, he will vent his anger by beating her. This man went on to say that a further consequence of bride price debts is that the married couple will live extremely frugally in poverty until all the debts have been repaid. Once this is done they can keep any money they earn or pigs that they have raised for themselves. So, the larger the debt, the harder it is to pay off and the longer the time the married couple live in poverty.

However, although the debts are supposed to be borne by the both partners, several key informants said that the responsibility for repaying the bride price debts often falls solely on the wife. So, just as bride price is often cited in justification of marital violence, it has also become a reason for husbands to overburden their wives with work while they themselves refuse to work. Just as men are leaving the responsibility for subsistence agriculture to women, they are leaving income generation to their wives as well. Again, this can lead to violence, since if a husband considers his wife is not working hard enough to repay the bride price debts, he will beat her.

The key informant cited above said that he felt sorry for women, since due to bride price debts they carry a large responsibility. As he remarked:
I’m sorry for the women, they carry a big responsibility. The husbands beat the wives, so that they work hard to look after pigs and accumulate money. Whenever they get a small amount of money from doing business or by selling coffee or chickens or whatever else they will look after the money and hang on to it so that they can repay the debt.

Because the responsibility for the repayment of the debts so often falls upon the wife, some key informants speak of bride price as a form of ‘imprisonment’ for women. The larger the bride price, the greater the debt and the longer it takes to be repaid. As one human rights defender noted:

The bad side of it is that with a large bride price, such as K10,000 and 10 pigs or 20 pigs, a woman will be imprisoned by her bride price. Whatever members of her husband’s group contribute, this is recorded in a list and if someone in the group dies or someone gets married, the married couple will have to contribute to this payment. The bride price is not contributed for free, it has to be paid back. It’s like they have placed a debt on the married couple. When bride price has been exchanged, the woman will work at paying back all the debts, until she is not burdened by anything. Women are imprisoned by this. The rights of women are imprisoned by this.

The imprisonment by debt was clearly enunciated by one female respondent whose bride price had comprised K4000 and 20 pigs and who told us that she carried most of the workload in her marriage, having been told that this was to pay the bride price. She feared that if she protested about the burden of work she would be beaten and so she remained silent.

One village court official did, however, say that some women do take their complaint to the village court, as follows:

There a lot of cases. People come to the village court, the wife will complain and the husband will complain. The husband will say that she is wilful (bikhed) and ‘I paid for her with bride price but she is wilful.’ The woman will say that he does not look after her: ‘He doesn’t help me with the work, he doesn’t help me with looking after the pigs, so I’m responsible for doing all the hard work to pay off the debt.’

**Violence**

A number of village court officials interviewed during fieldwork said that a high proportion of the cases they deal with are marital problems, including intimate partner violence. Our women respondents had a high level of exposure to physical violence, including violence from men, other women and relatives. Fifteen women indicated that they were subjected to physical violence from their husbands, putting forward a number of explanations, including money, polygyny/infidelity, alcohol and not fulfilling the husband’s expectations, such as not having dinner ready. Women were also subject to physical violence from other relatives, including blood relatives and in-laws, as reported by five women, including two cases where the woman was accused of witchcraft and subjected to violence. In one case, a woman was beaten by her husband’s relatives after she used violence against her husband. As we noted above, women usually define violence in physical terms, and this may mean that other forms of violence — emotional, economic and sexual — are even more normalised than physical violence. In any case, the data suggests that women are subject to a range of violent behaviours, not only physical violence.

Eight women reported that the physical violence they were subjected to was alcohol-related. One female respondent reported that when her husband returned home drunk he would start smashing things in the house and arguments would arise. Ultimately she would hit her husband with a stick and he would respond by punching her. In one case, the respondent reported that when her husband came home drunk he would demand money and break things and steal her money when she refused to accede to his requests.
Several of the women reported physical violence in the context of polygynous relationships (see above), with ex-husbands and their new wives, or due to their husband’s infidelity. Three women indicated that violence towards them resulted when they questioned their husband’s infidelity. For example, one woman said her husband was a womaniser and beat her when she complained about his affairs. Another woman, Rena (Text Box 9, p. 20), said that her husband used to go out with other women and hit her with a knife and beat her if she raised the issue.

Controlling Behaviour
The WHO definition of intimate partner violence used for this report includes controlling behaviour as a form of violence (see p. 6) and this behaviour is common among men in Jiwaka. Despite their own infidelity or their desire to have more than one wife, men in Jiwaka are very keen to control their wives. This is usually motivated by sexual jealousy and men’s fear that their wives will have extramarital affairs. Indeed, one female key informant told us that some husbands prefer their wives to remain unwashed (‘stap dirti’) so that she is not attractive to other men. Rather than a wife being clean and wearing good clothes, the preference is that they remain at home doing household chores. As Laura (Text Box 4, p. 15) reported, her husband treats her well (because he does not beat her and gives her some money) but he does not allow her to go out or go to the market.

According to one respondent, husbands are more likely to beat their wives when they are away from home at markets, especially if they see their wives talking to other men. Indeed, some men keep a careful watch over their wives when they are selling goods at markets. One woman interviewed by the research team, for example, was being watched by her husband when we came across her at the Kudjip market a few days after the interview.

Conflicts over Money
‘Lots of conflicts between husband and wife have their roots with money’
(Key Informant)

A number of key informants highlighted that conflicts over money are common in Jiwaka, with one female key informant saying it was a very big problem. The two main factors triggering conflicts over money are: 1) husbands not contributing financially to the household, and 2) husbands unjustly demanding money from their spouses. These are clearly examples of economic violence.40

1) Husbands not contributing financially to the household: Conflicts over money relate not only to men’s demands for their spouses’ money, but also to men not sharing resources when they sell cash crops, are in paid employment or have some other source of income.

Many researchers have raised the issue of men retreating from financial obligations to the household when women gain access to income. An unintended consequence of increased financial autonomy for women is that husbands or partners often opt out of contributing, or reduce their contributions, to the household expenses so that the women must meet these shortfalls. ‘There is considerable evidence,’ says Mayoux, ‘that women’s increased control over income may be accompanied by a withdrawal of male contributions for their own luxury expenditure, limiting the total increase in income going into household wellbeing’ (1999b:972; see Haile et al. 2012:257).41 In Jiwaka, this is a very common occurrence, though some men have not contributed financially in the first place.

According to a key informant, some women say that prior to their marriage their husband used money as part of their seduction strategy (grisim) but refuse to give any money to them after they are married. She also said that some men will beat their wife if she tries to rely solely on him for money.
For some households in Jiwaka, coffee is a source of income and the issue of sharing this with wives is a source of conflict. Several key informants told us that despite women doing all of the labour required for the production of coffee, men seize the coffee when it is ready for sale, so that they can, as one remarked, ‘see the money first (lukim moni postaim)’ (see also Voice for Change 2013:39). One key informant described the inequity in sharing coffee income:

When you look closely at coffee, the husband does not pick the coffee. When it comes to picking coffee it is the wife who picks coffee. She will pick it, bag it and carry it to sell it. Men are happy to sell coffee but only a few men in the community have good thoughts about the money and divide it up well. If a man gets K100, he will only give K50 to the wife to look after the children. When the man gets K50 he will go off and drink cola or other things with other men. When the woman gets K50 she will buy cooking oil, rice or other things needed for the house. When the man returns home he doesn’t buy anything for the house with the K50 he had, but still expects to eat from the K50 he gave to his wife. Lots of men when they sell a bag of coffee and they get K100, they will keep K80 and give K20 to the wife or keep K70 and give K30 to the wife. Think about how much K30 or K20 will buy. K70 or K80 will go on beer and then he will return home to the house and kick plates and cups about, demanding more money. Where will the woman get it from? K30 or K20 is not a lot of money.

Similar points about the inequity surrounding coffee income were raised by a village court official when he said:

It is the same with coffee. The women work hard to pick the coffee and sell it to roadside buyers. They will get good money and will think about the family. The man will go and take the coffee bag and get lots of money from selling the coffee but only give a small amount to the wife. Sometimes the man will go to a hotel or club and drink beer. When he is finished drinking beer he will return home and demand money from his wife. ‘The money you have — bring it here!’ The woman will respond by saying ‘No, use your own money, my money is for the children and myself.’ The husband will respond by saying ‘Hey, where did you get it? Is it your land? Is it your coffee? Give me your money!’ Men do not have a good reason but they beat their wives. This is normal and I’ve seen it lots of times. Lots of fault lies with the husband, but with the women there is not a lot [of fault].

As found in the research undertaken among coffee smallholders as part of the DNH project, coffee in Jiwaka is seen as men’s business (Eves and Titus 2017a, 2017b). At the end of the day, because the coffee trees are planted on the husband’s land, the income from it is seen as his. This is clearly alluded to by the village court official above when he cites what men say to justify their appropriation of coffee income.42

In demanding money from their wives, even when they have not done any of the work, men use arguments about being the head of the household. Women do have more control over income gained from the garden crops they plant for sale. Generally, this income is seen as belonging to the women, though this does not prevent some husbands demanding it when they have depleted their own resources. However, evidence from research in Eastern Highlands Province shows that men generally focus on the coffee income because they believe that selling vegetables brings in little money compared to coffee (Eves and Titus n.d.). Even though many men are reluctant to engage in income generating activities themselves, they are, nevertheless, keen to know what their spouses have earned. One man suggested that a man will ‘wok long stoktok’ — that is do a stocktake when his wife returns from the market in an effort to ascertain whether there is money that he can appropriate.

Men in paid employment also do not share their income with their wives. According to one key informant,
lots of working men don’t use their money properly, they spend the money on beer. It’s a big issue. A few men spend their money wisely but most of the men spend the money on alcohol. … Some men are ok they share their money but lots of the women who come here [to Voice for Change] the husbands don’t share the money equally with them, especially the men like teachers, or those working in mining companies.

Another key informant remarked that lots in her community (‘hauslain’) work for wages on a plantation, but when they get their fortnightly pay cheque they will spend it all on alcohol at the weekend. Men’s failure to share their income with their spouse is compounded by the community belief that a wife is not entitled to her husband’s income or to criticise his spending, despite her looking after the household and the children while he is at work.

The withdrawal of financial contributions to the household also occurs in the context of polygynous relationships for, as I noted above, when a man takes a new wife he often directs his financial resources to her to the neglect of his other wife or wives.

2) Husbands unjustly demanding money from their spouses: When men do not contribute labour to the household and have no other income, they are reliant on their spouses’ income generating activity for access to money for their discretionary spending. Much of the conflict and violence associated with money concerns men, either sober or drunk, unjustly demanding money from their wives. As the following account from a village court official makes clear, some women are subject to violent behaviour, which sees household property destroyed as well as physical violence, with or without weapons, in men’s efforts to get access to the wives’ money, generally so that they can spend it on alcohol, but also on marijuana or gambling:

Lots of fault for conflicts and violence lies with the husband. Men, we are lazy, we go and play cards and wander aimlessly around and then return home and give our wives a hard time, demanding food. ‘Do you have a plate of food ready for me or not?’ It is normally like this but lots of times the husband will drink beer. There are lots of village court records of the drunk husband going home and beating his wife for no reason. The husband will beat his wife for no reason, destroy things, throw things out of the house, kick all the household utensils and beat his wife until she is unconscious. It is because he has drunk a lot. Now there are also drugs and they smoke marijuana. They are mad, they go and beat their wives with a stick, demanding they give them money or any of the small earnings they made from marketing. Men expect their wives will give them money, so that they can go around, drink beer and play cards. The woman will think about the family and looking after the children. She will budget for the children but the man comes and puts pressure and demands that she bring him the money.

One key informant said that sometimes husbands not only demand money from their spouses, but if it is not forthcoming they will beat their wives and take any valuables, including such things as pigs, and go and sell them, so that they can use the money for alcohol or marijuana.

For many women who rely on selling produce or other items at market for income generation, life is quite precarious and the amount of money that they make is not very large; if they give any of their savings to their husband, they do not have surplus funds to invest in income generation, as the following account explains:

When a husband spends money unwisely on alcohol, cards or playing poker machines, he will make demands on his wife for money. The woman will think that if she gives her husband K50 what will she use tomorrow when she needs to buy stock to sell at the market and what will she use to look after the family? The capital (bon moni) of K100 she has to keep but the K20 she makes in profit she uses to buy food for
Three women reported that their husband’s physical violence towards them was related to money. One woman reported that her husband used to beat her up when she refused to give him money and another woman, Naomi (Text Box 10), said that both her ex-husband and his new wife assaulted her, mostly over money. Even though she is no longer married to him, she reported that he regularly comes to her and demands money, threatening her with violence if she refuses.

Text Box 10: Naomi’s Story

Naomi grew up in a polygynous family and her father had five wives, her mother being the second wife. Because Naomi was the first-born daughter she didn’t attend school because she was expected to stay home and help her mother and eventually get married. Naomi’s husband left her because she was unable to carry children, and married another woman with whom he had three children. When she was married, Naomi and her husband used to make decisions together, but now she makes all her own decisions, though an adopted son also contributes to decision-making. Her former husband is jealous of Naomi and when her garden is ready for harvesting, he comes and asks for money. He has come and destroyed three of her gardens, taking the vegetables to feed his new wife, since they do not have enough money. Naomi reported her husband to the police and they came to arrest him but he ran away. Since reporting him to the police, he has not ruined her garden again, but still comes and demands money regularly. Sometimes Naomi refuses his requests and sometimes gives in to him, believing she has to be humble and help him. She has also been subject to violent threats and once he threatened to bash her if she didn’t give him money. Naomi has also been subject to violence from her husband’s second wife who cut Naomi’s finger in one attack and had to pay Naomi compensation. When Naomi was still married, her husband used to demand money from her after she had been to the market and would beat her if she didn’t give him any. He also used to come home drunk, ask

According to key informants, husbands pressuring their wives for the money they have earned at market is common. As one female key informant said:

A woman will hold on to her money, but the husband will come asking for money. He will come and ask her for money and she will reply that ‘I don’t have any money’. However, the man will be determined and say ‘but you marketed’ and the woman will respond by saying that she got a small amount of money for school fees, bus fares and lunch money for the children or something like that. But the man will be very determined and the woman out of fear that he might hit her will give him five kina, so that he can buy cigarettes, betel nut or something like that. Some men will beat their wives because they have spoken assertively and the wife has denied having any money. If a woman denies that she has money a man will say ‘Yesterday you marketed and you are saying you have no money. Give me a two kina or a five kina note for cigarettes.’ If the woman is determined and still says no, he will be angry and fight over this.
As indicated above, some women accede to requests for money because of the threat of violence if they say no. Hope (Text Box 5, p. 17) whose husband would beat her when she didn’t prepare food quickly enough for him, was subject to aggressive borrowing not only by her husband but also his sister. We also gathered examples of aggressive borrowing/bullying that did not include physical violence — but which constitutes economic abuse or violence. For example, a woman in a polygynous marriage said that her husband and his first wife regarded her assets as their property and also refused to share money with her. Several of the cases of alcohol-related violence also involved money. For example, a women reported that when her husband came home drunk he would demand money and break things and steal things when she refused to give it to him. The violence that occurs in the context of alcohol consumption often stems from conflict over the use of money as well as being inflamed by alcohol. A central issue concerning alcohol consumption is that men use money for their own pleasure while women think the money should be used for the entire household.

As is evident from the incidents of violence cited above, women often refuse their spouses’ bullying demands to hand over their money. Women also engage in other strategies to keep possession of their money, including hiding money:

> To avoid giving money to their spouses, lots of women hide their money. But some men know the movements of their wives, so are aware of where they keep their money. Women are aware of their husbands’ behaviour if they keep asking for money. The women are aware and so they try and avoid having to give them money. But if a woman is afraid or she is a generous woman and gives the money, in these circumstances the household will not have any food to eat. Some women will wonder why they work hard to look after children and to increase the renown of their husbands if they are beaten. Some women will think this way. … There are two ways — one involves a strong woman challenging her husband and hiding money. The other involves a woman who isn’t strong and the husband knows her movements and will constantly demand money. The husband will forcefully demand money and the wife is afraid and gives it to him. This kind of marriage is unstable.

As this quote from a former policewoman shows, whether a woman’s strategy of hiding money is successful depends on the personal character of the woman and whether the husband has been able to ascertain where she hides her money. According to this key informant, if a woman is afraid of her husband or is a generous person, the prospects of successfully keeping the money are reduced. Some men also use their own strategies to gain access to their wife’s money when their demands fail. A man will carefully observe his wife’s movements and try to determine where she may have hidden her money. Some woman avoid this problem by saving with Voice for Change, though there have been cases of husbands approaching the organisation and demanding their wife’s money.

**Resource Depleting Behaviour**

Domestic conflicts often arise as a consequence of men’s resource depleting activities because wives challenge their wasteful expenditure. As we noted above, men usually demand money in order to spend it on alcohol, marijuana, gambling or women. However, conflict and violence often result when women contest their spouse’s resource depleting consumption. Women are not backward about questioning their husbands about their use of money. That women are prepared to question men’s use of income or refuse to give their husbands money when they ask, suggests that they have some agency and are quite prepared to contest the ‘head of the household’ norm that is common in Papua New Guinea. There are, of course, risks in such strategies, and violence from male partners is an egregious example. Women’s attempts at realising agency are, thus, constrained by the real threat of violence (see Campbell and Mannell 2016).
Reducing Risk of Violence

The women of Jiwaka use conscious strategies to reduce the risk of conflict and violence. Often this entails women taking responsibility for the conflict and violence in a marriage and seeking to assuage or pacify their spouse by not doing things that will challenge his behaviour or enrage him, no matter how minor. For some this means submitting to their husband’s demands. As we noted above, many women subscribe to conservative gender norms that require women to submit to their husbands. This is also how some respondents said that they minimised conflict, one woman saying that because her husband gets angry with her (though not violent) if she has not washed his clothes, to appease him she washes them and then he is happy.

A small number of women adopt the strategy of opting out of income generating activities — for example, a woman who was pressured by her family to contribute more to compensation and bride price payments when they saw her selling at the market simply stopped selling at the market. Another woman who was subject to gossip and harassment from her sister-in-law, left the village where she was living.

Hope, whose experiences were recounted in Text Box 5 (p. 17), said that to avoid being harassed for money by her husband and his sisters, she keeps her distance. Another woman advocated being humble and makes sure she never talks back to anyone to avoid conflict. One woman, Barbara (Text Box 2, p. 14), whose husband never tells her how he spends money, complained about this to him but since he still refused to tell her has learned to live with it.

For some women, the way to avoid conflict and violence is simply to not ask their husband for money. A number of women said it was important for women to inform their husband what they are doing, how they are earning money and what the purpose of earning it is. In addition to this, some women advocate sharing the money with the husband. Naomi (Text Box 10, p. 30) said that she tells her husband why she is saving money in the bank so that he understands and suggested that it is when there is no understanding that violence occurs. Another woman, whose husband was violent and controlling and who had broken her nose and hand, advised that the way to resolve family problems was to keep your husband informed about what you are doing and how you earn money. She also advised that wives should not ask their husbands for money. Another woman whose husband was non-violent offered similar advice — that is, wives should explain to their husbands what they are marketing and what the money is to be used for. She also believed that wives should share the money they earn to avoid problems.

Some women have escaped violence by divorcing their husbands and returning to the natal village. However, while a woman can respond to a violent or dysfunctional marriage by running away to her natal village, this is not always a satisfactory solution, for a number of reasons, including her parents insisting that she return to her husband because they have received bride price (see Text Box 3, p. 15). If she does not return to her husband, they may be forced to return the bride price, which is likely to be difficult if it has been spent or distributed to others in the community. Moreover, in situations where a woman attempts to leave a violent husband, she may lose all the assets accumulated when married and can also lose custody of her children, as the father may insist that they remain with him. There is also no certainty that if a woman returns to her natal village she will have access to land and this depends on her father (if he is still alive) or her brother or brothers (if the father is deceased). This was the situation that confronted Annie (Text Box 11) who divorced her violent husband. When she returned to her natal village, her brother, encouraged by his wife, only allowed her access to one block of land and refused to give her a coffee block, which would have made earning sufficient income far easier.

Clearly, leaving a violent relationship poses immense difficulties and a woman may consider it impossible to pursue this option. For such a woman, remaining with the husband means she must endure the ‘pain’ of the relationship. Pain, which one woman remarked, stops deep inside. This respondent said that for many women their ‘normal life is a life of pain (normal laifstyle i stap, i stap wantaim peri)’. She said that one response to enduring such pain is to pray, for while this does not lessen the pain, it allows such women to be at peace (stap isi).
Text Box 11: Annie’s Story

Annie grew up in a polygynous family. Her father owned a large amount of land and wanted more sons to give it to. Since he had only one son he married a second wife. Annie met her husband at school and eventually married him, going to live with him and his parents. Annie worked hard to save money so that her husband could do a sales course and when he completed it he got a job with a brewery. When working at the brewery, Annie’s husband started going out with other women, misusing money on beer and being violent towards her, breaking her leg. Due to his violence she divorced her husband and returned to live in her natal village, where her brother gave her a plot of land. However, her brother, who is encouraged by his wife, did not want to give her a block of coffee, which means it is hard for her to earn sufficient income. Annie has had verbal arguments and violent fights with her sister-in-law over land use, which have been resolved through mediation by a church leader. To minimise conflict and violence in her relationship with her brother and his wife, she accepts what is given to her and doesn’t go beyond that. She also gives her first harvest to her brother’s family and helps them, sharing what she has to reduce the risk of violence. Although life is difficult, Annie feels now that she is in control of her life and her income without her husband. She has more courage now and can give advice and encourage other single women to work hard and make use of their land to make money.
Case Study 2 — Chimbu Province

The research was undertaken in Chimbu Province at two sites near PNG’s highest mountain, Mt Wilhelm, in Kundiawa-Gembogl District. The research team worked in cooperation with two partner organisations of Oxfam, the local community-based organisations, KGWAN and IRRM that recruited respondents for interview.

Table 8 gives some background demographic information on the Chimbu respondents, including the age range, the number who had borne children and the number with dependants. In all, 55 women were interviewed in Chimbu, 29 at site 1 (KGWAN) and 26 at site 2 (IRRM).44

Table 8: Female respondent demographic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range (years)</th>
<th>19–60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of women who have borne children</td>
<td>51 (92.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of children per women</td>
<td>1–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children borne</td>
<td>15945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women with dependants</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number range of dependants per women</td>
<td>1–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependants</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 indicates respondents’ marital status, whether they had been married previously and the number currently in polygynous marriages. Forty-three (78.2%) of the marriages had entailed the exchange of bride price. The largest bride price was K20,000 and five pigs and the smallest K300. The highest monetary amount was K20,000 and the lowest K200. The largest number of pigs was 15 and the least was one. Three bride price payments included one or two goats and one included three sheep.47

Table 9: Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currently married</th>
<th>49 (89.1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separated, divorced or abandoned</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number with previous marriages</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number currently in polygynous marriages</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages with bride price</td>
<td>43 (78.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 outlines respondents’ educational levels, indicating that most had no formal education or had attended primary school only. 48

Table 10: Highest level of education attended

| No formal education | 15 |
| Primary | 23 |
| Secondary | 16 |
| Vocational/Technical | 1 |
| Tertiary | 1 |
As Table 11 indicates, the majority of women interviewed in Chimbu were members of the Catholic Church, followed by the Revival Centres of PNG and the Lutheran Church. Like the women of Jiwaka, many in Chimbu were active in the community, filling roles such as Sunday school teacher, church worker, elementary school teacher, extension worker or women’s representative.

### Table 11: Church membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revival Centres of PNG</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Church</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Outreach Centre (COC)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Brotherhood Church (EBC)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblies of God</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Square Gospel Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazarene Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Life Centre (CLC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Government Revival Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 13 (23.6%) women had a bank account, one of whom also had a joint account with her husband. A number of women used other people’s accounts, including one who used her sister’s account, one who used another person’s account, one who used her husband’s account and three who used the IRRM account. Twenty (36.4%) women had mobile phones.

### Women’s Income Sources

All the interviewees earned income from garden produce, selling such items as sugar cane, beans, sweet potato, cabbage, cauliflower, potato, broccoli, carrots, garlic and spring onions. The main crop grown for sale is brown onions (or ‘bulb onion’) which grows extremely well near Mt Wilhelm and has been promoted through the Oxfam livelihoods program.

A small number of the women earned income from livestock, with four indicating that they sold pigs as well as vegetable produce. Only three women said that they sold cooked food and one that she sold betel nut. A small number received a wage, four being elementary teachers, and one received an allowance because she was the women’s representative on the Local Level Government (LLG) council. Two women’s source of income was their husband’s wage, one of whom also received remittances from a working daughter. One woman said that she lends money for interest and also earns some money from gambling. Some of the women said that they had turned to income generation because their spouses did not contribute financially to the household.

### Challenges for Women’s Income Generation

Even though some of the interviewees had been forced into income generation because of their husbands’ failures to contribute to the household, many women highlighted its positive dimensions, saying they have enough money and food for the family and can meet family needs.

The women interviewed in Chimbu spoke of the challenges they face when trying to earn an income — from meeting the costs entailed in growing produce and transporting it to market to dealing with the demands of
relatives and others. Several women pointed to the difficulties involved in growing the brown onions promoted by Oxfam — the high price of seed, the requirements for chemicals and fertilizer and the long and arduous process of planting and looking after this type of crop.

Compared to our respondents in Jiwaka, those in Chimbu faced considerable problems in reaching markets to sell their produce. The respondents from Jiwaka lived near to the busy Highlands Highway and within easy reach of markets in places nearby, such as Kudjip, Banz or Minj. The women of Chimbu, in contrast, are distant from markets and the local cash flow and demand are limited. Some produce can be marketed nearby at Gembogl, which has a few government facilities, including a health centre and school, but it is necessary to travel to Kundiawa to sell more realistic quantities of produce. Many women complained about the cost of transport and the poor condition of the road, which regularly makes transporting produce to Kundiawa difficult and sometimes impossible. The rugged landscape means that people not only have to garden on extremely steep slopes, but that the road is often subject to landslides that interrupt vehicular access for long periods. When this occurs, a person wishing to sell produce in Kundiawa must pay for a vehicle to transport their produce to the landslide and pay people to carry the produce over the rubble to another vehicle, which then transports it to Kundiawa. Several women also complained of roadblocks by armed criminals (raskals) and being robbed of their money or goods. Sometimes these criminals use violence against those travelling the road. As one woman reported, not only are people beaten up, but one man was hacked to death and women have been raped along this road.

Many women noted that a big challenge to income generation was too much competition to sell the same produce. When this occurs, they must either reduce their prices or forego selling their goods, which then go to waste, resulting in financial loss, especially in regard to brown onions which are expensive to grow. Sometimes they are forced to stay in town overnight, which is difficult for women who do not have relatives to stay with and entails additional transport costs to take the produce from the market and then back again in the morning. The option of staying on in Kundiawa also creates problems for women when they return home the next day, as does returning late from the market more generally, with some women reporting angry, suspicious husbands demanding to know what they have been doing. Several women reported that women have been beaten up for coming home late from the market, either because their spouse was suspicious of them or accused them of neglecting their household duties (see p. 52). Returning late from the market can also mean that their spouse spends hard-earned money buying food because the wife has not prepared dinner at the expected time.

The lack of market infrastructure means that women (as well as men) are forced to sell their produce in often squalid conditions, without adequate protection from the elements. There are also issues of security, not only in travelling to and from Kundiawa, but also at the markets, with some women reporting a problem with thieves, especially pick-pockets, at the market. Not only does this mean women may have their takings stolen but when they return home their husbands will demand to know what happened to the money and may not believe that it has been stolen.

One woman said that she wanted to develop a piggery but found she did not have enough time because of housework. She said that she is also constrained by not having enough capital to start the business and cannot get a loan because she does not have enough time to go to market to make money. Another woman said that although she has vegetables in the garden she does not take them to market to sell because she is ashamed of selling in public. This issue has arisen in other DNH research, several respondents in Bougainville saying that shame prevents them from generating an income from marketing (see Eves 2018).

Several women complained that people demand goods on ‘credit’, but do not repay the debt (see also Eves 2017a; Eves and Lusby 2018). One remarked that her income generation creates increased demands from her family and in-laws. Like the women in Jiwaka, several women mentioned that their income generating activities lead to jealousy and gossip from other people. One woman commented that some women become jealous
of other women who earn more money through their work and bully them by gossiping about the way they dress or the items they have in their home. Her husband’s family were an obstacle to one woman’s income generation because they complained about her marketing and so she finds it difficult to go to market and now only does it occasionally.

More than any other women interviewed during the entire DNH research, those in Chimbu complained most about the heavy workload of income generation, which means they lack time for other duties, including domestic labour, let alone for rest or relaxation. They also complained of tiredness and the physical toll that work took on their bodies. Several women spoke of back pain and one woman said that she felt weak and dizzy and sometimes faint, while another said that she was made sick from planting onions. Much of this can be put down to the unequal work burdens that women carry, which is sometimes referred to a double burden or a double day (see Eves 2017c). As one key informant commented, ‘woklod i kilim mipela (the workload is killing us)’.

**Workload and Gendered Division of Labour**

Like the women of Jiwaka, the women of Chimbu have heavy workloads, being responsible for the agricultural labour that ensures that their household has enough to eat. Traditionally, there was a clear gender division of labour in agricultural and household work, with men responsible for building houses, supplying firewood, the heavy labour of felling large forest trees for new gardens and digging drains. Women were responsible for planting and tending the garden and looking after the house, children and pigs.

The women of Chimbu, like those of Jiwaka, bemoan the fact their husbands do not help them with the work, especially in the garden. The imbalance in workloads and the lack of support from their spouses was a recurring refrain from our respondents. One woman, explaining why her brother-in-law’s wife left him, said: ‘She worked hard to look after the family and her husband didn’t help her … It is common to all men round here.’

The imbalance of work produces violence, perpetrated by both husbands and wives. As one woman reported, her husband did not contribute any work either in the home or the garden and when she asked him for help in the garden he would beat her. Another woman reported using violence against her husband as well as being on the receiving end but somewhat contradictorily said they live together well and their relationship is mutually respectful. The source of the violent conflict is the perception that the other spouse is not meeting their work responsibilities. Husband and wife will beat each other if one thinks the other is not doing enough work in the home or garden or in raising pigs. The problems begin, for example, when a wife asks her husband to help in the garden and he does not, and so when he comes home she beats him with a stick. The husband uses violence against her when, for example, she hasn’t cleared the garden or looked after the pigs. Sally-Anne (Text Box 12, p. 38) also reported that her husband uses violence against her if she has not done as much work in the garden or in looking after the children as he thinks she should have. As we show later, this is often connected to income generation, since this work detracts from the time available for domestic and childcare responsibilities (see p. 53). Much like some women of Jiwaka, Sally-Anne evaluates her marriage in a way that belies the reality of a violent relationship, since she says her husband treats her well even though he beats her if she is not fully submissive or does not do all the work he expects of her. This suggests that violence and female submission are normalised by both men and women in Chimbu.

Although the overwhelming burden of gardening, both for subsistence and for income generation, falls to women, some men do contribute to it, though this often appears to be in the form of ‘help’ rather than consistent sustained and equal labour contributions. However, a small number of marriages appear to be relatively equitable. For example, Maria (Text Box 13, p. 39) reported that she and her husband do not argue and that he does not control her or beat her. They help each other in their work, share ideas and make decisions together.
As in Jiwaka, women in Chimbu also bear the burden of unpaid work in the home (such as carrying water and firewood to the house, cooking, cleaning and childcare). Also like the women of Jiwaka, Chimbu women adhere to conservative gender norms that ascribe responsibility for domestic labour and childcare to them, and so they generally expressed little expectation that men might help in this area.

Text Box 12: Sally-Anne’s Story

Sally-Anne is a 34-year-old woman, with one child and three dependants. She said her parents treated her well within the constraints of poverty, trying to feed and clothe her and educate her, but they lived a hard life. They relied on selling garden crops to earn a living but oversupply resulted in poor returns or not being able to sell their produce at all. Her father was violent, beating her mother, who had main responsibility for the garden crops, if he suspected she did not show or hand over to him any money she earned. Her parents valued education, including for the daughter, and raised her to be a hospitable community member, to share food with others and to survive materially by maintaining a garden and raising pigs. In their household, Sally-Anne’s father made the decisions, both in general and specifically about money and resources. Sally-Anne completed grade 8 but did not continue her education because first her father died and then her mother, leaving her without means to continue her education. After her parents’ deaths her family encouraged her to marry so that she would have some support. She was in a relationship with her husband before they married. Her husband is 40 years old, with secondary school education. Sally-Anne’s marriage did not involve the exchange of bride price and instead the husband’s parents agreed their son would help Sally-Anne look after her siblings. The agreement has been honoured and they also look after her grandmother and her husband’s parents. He makes all the decisions in their household, including about land, income expenditure, health, education and the disciplining of children, with his wife only occasionally contributing to decisions. He also decided that she may occasionally work at the church and with women in the local community-based organisation. She considers a good wife to be one who is humble and submits to her husband, who tends to the garden and looks after the children and pigs. Sally-Anne says her husband looks after her well, spends their money on the family and sometimes works with her in the garden but he also beats her if she is not fully submissive, does not do all the work he expects or if she does not make a profit at market. In regard to the latter, she believes the only strategy to avoid violence is to completely submit to his will by not making any purchases herself and returning home immediately after a day at the market, giving him any earnings and explaining to him all the sales and profits for that day. Her husband does not have an income and depends on his wife for income generation.

According to several women, a good wife accepts responsibility for domestic labour and childcare. ‘A good wife,’ said one, ‘takes good care of her children, cleans the house, does the laundry and cooks food.’ There were several variations on this theme including: ‘A good wife gives birth and looks after the house and money’; ‘A good wife spends time looking after her daughters and looking after the household’; and ‘A good wife looks after her children, does domestic chores, and looks after the pigs’. Submission was a common theme enunciated by many women of Chimbu, several saying that a good wife should submit to her husband. As women said, ‘A good wife submits to her husband’; ‘A good wife submits to her husband and is a good house-woman looking after her home, children, garden and pigs’; and she stays at home and doesn’t roam and submits to her husband’.
One woman, Julie (Text Box 14, p. 40), reported that if the time she spent at the market earning money left her with insufficient time to do all her domestic and child-raising tasks in what her husband regarded as a timely manner, he would become verbally aggressive towards her and ‘argue with her for not preparing food for the kids early’. This appeared to be a common problem, several women commenting on the risk of violence for women whose income generation requires them to go to markets. It is a common occurrence that if a husband considers his wife to be away from home too much or is late returning home, he reacts violently because he considers she is neglecting her domestic duties.

Even though, as we noted above, there was little expectation for men to do domestic labour or look after children, a small number of men did in fact help their wives with household chores, but this was generally occasional rather than regular support. For men, it is a question of helping rather than taking equal responsibility for this kind of labour. The woman above, whose husband was a schoolteacher who worked in another part of the province, reported that when he was home he would help with household labour, such as cooking food and washing the children — though only if he was not drunk. Another woman also said her husband helped with housework and another said that her husband would help when she was tired by cooking and washing dishes and also helps her in the garden.

Compared to Jiwaka where we heard many complaints from women about their spouses being totally idle and spending their time wandering around, there were only a handful in Chimbu. One woman whose marriage involved no violence and only occasional arguments said her husband contributes a reasonable amount of work
in the garden and noted that he will wander for a week but only when there is no work for him to do in the garden. Like most women of Chimbu, she carried the responsibility for the work in the home.

Text Box 14: Julie’s Story

Julie is 48 years old and has six children. She has no formal education, largely because an aunt used her as a baby-sitter instead. She grew up with her birth parents and there was no violence in the family. They earned money by growing and selling coffee beans and other garden crops and her father made decisions about the money. As a child, Julie was taught by her parent to help with their work and not wander around. Julie has been married twice. She separated from her first husband because he took many wives, neglected Julie and their children and did not provide any material or practical support to them. He was usually absent, did not eat at the house, did not provide any money and did not help with work in the home or growing and selling garden crops. He would bring other women into their home and murdered one of them. Julie married her second husband when he came to teach in the area and his first wife did not accompany him. A bride price of K600 and three pigs was exchanged. Because he teaches in another province he is only intermittently at home and resents that she has not accompanied him. Despite being on a salary, he does not contribute to the household, instead spending his income on beer. Julie does the work of growing garden crops and also has the main, and often the sole responsibility, for looking after the children and domestic tasks. The main source of household income is generated solely by Julie through growing and selling garden produce at market (sweet potato, cabbage, cauliflower, brown onions), raising and selling pigs, and sometimes also gambling. She holds and controls the income independently and does not seek anyone else’s permission to spend it, which she does on food and clothing. Julie is the decision-maker in the second marriage, including in regard to land use, income expenditure and the education and disciplining of her children, as the husband is usually absent. When her husband is at home in Chimbu and sober he will help with domestic chores and with the children and treats her well, as long as she does not disagree with him. However, if he has been drinking he criticises Julie and uses violence against her and the children. He also becomes verbally aggressive if he thinks Julie is slow to complete domestic tasks and care of the children when she has been at the markets earning money. She is able to minimise her husband’s anger if she appeases him by buying him smokes and beer on her way home from the markets.

However, when women were asked about what makes a good husband, some women listed not wandering around, suggesting that the problem might be a wide one. One female respondent when asked what makes a good husband said, ‘A good husband does not leave his family and roam around and play cards, only coming home to eat. He does not beat his wife.’ An ongoing problem in this woman’s marriage was that the husband plays cards and when she criticises him about this he becomes angry and they have arguments. He does, however, help her in the garden, though she has the main responsibility for growing and selling the produce.

Vera (Text Box 15) reported that her brutal, wandering husband plays no role in family life and is completely absent other than returning to rape her and their eldest daughter, whom he made pregnant. When he is present he does not provide for his family and does not help in the garden. Now when he returns and tries to re-enter the house, Vera chases him away.
Text Box 15: Vera’s Story

Vera is 55 years old with five children. She has formal education and grew up in a Christian home and was treated well by her parents, who taught her Christian values and trained her to marry well. When Vera was growing up, a tribal fight forced her and her parents to flee into the bush. As part of learning how to have a good marriage, she helped her mother in the garden and to raise pigs. Vera has been married twice and in both marriages she was the first and only wife. For her first marriage, a bride price of K1200 and 10 pigs was exchanged. Her husband was violent and after she ran away and stayed with relatives she met her second husband. For her second marriage a bride price of K400 and five pigs was exchanged. Violence in the second marriage occurs mainly when Vera refuses to have sex with her husband or when she asks him to contribute money and help sustain the household. He wanders around and only comes home to force Vera into sex and impregnate her. He also raped and impregnated their oldest daughter, providing no material support, not even a nappy. Vera is informally separated from her second husband and when he returns and tries to re-enter the house she chases him away. Vera and her eldest son make the decisions about all aspects of the household. She generates income by planting, harvesting and selling garden produce, mainly sweet potato and beans at the markets, but has no support in this work. Vera holds the income she earns and makes decisions about how it is spent but seeks permission for the expenditure from her eldest son. The money is spent on seedlings for the garden and household items such as oil, soap, salt and stationery and Vera saves the income she earns in the house for when needed. Vera is considering marrying a third time to an older man, who can look after her and her family well.

Another respondent said that her husband does as he pleases, largely because she has been unable to give him any children. He does not help in the garden or in generating income, goes out whenever he wants, generally does not stay at home much, and is having affairs with other women in the village. Despite this treatment, she reported no conflict with her husband, mainly because she does not talk back to him when he is angry. Another woman said that her husband usually helps with household chores but she sometimes gets angry and argues with him because he wanders and does not help with the garden or with the pigs. Despite her anger, her husband keeps quiet in such situations and never talks back.

Household Decision-Making

Male Decision-Making

The notion that the husband is the head of the household was common among the respondents in Chimbu and was usually supported by the women themselves. This was the case with Cathy (Text Box 16, p. 42) who said that her husband is the main decision-maker in their household, which she regarded as appropriate because he is rightly the head of the house. This relationship is not characterised by physical violence but it includes other forms of violence, such as the economic violence of squandering household money on gambling.

The accounts of the women make it clear that their husbands subscribe to the belief that the husband is the head of the household and so should be responsible for decision-making. One 33-year-old woman with four children commented that her husband is the decision-maker in their household and when she tries to contribute to decision-making, he says she must submit to him. He also tells her to listen to him, saying their marriage will be strong as a result. In the past she used to talk back to him but now she does not.
Several of the respondents reported dictatorial husbands who made most decisions and told their wives what to do. As a 37-year-old women with five children said, her husband tells her to go to the garden with his mother and do whatever she tells her to do. While both spouses make decisions about education and resources, her husband makes most decisions about what to spend the money on. However, she keeps the money she earns from selling things at the village market and does not give this to her husband, though she conceded it was very little money.

There are cases of men who are quite domineering but who do not beat their spouses, as in the case of one 32-year-old woman with four children. Her husband was an alcoholic and would tell her he could do what he liked and she should shut up and take care of the children. He never beat his wife but it is clear that he was emotionally abusive and violent. Another woman was also subject to her husband’s heavily controlling behaviour, although he was not physically violent. The husband, who is much older than she is, does not allow her to speak to other women or men and when he allows her to go to the market or church he tells her that she must walk straight home afterwards. When she goes to market and spends money she is very careful to explain to him how she used the money. As in some cases mentioned above, women are careful not to antagonise their partners and engage in conscious strategies to mitigate and diffuse their anger. In short, women take on the burden of maintaining peace in the household (see also Ahmed 2014).

While women may speak of joint decision-making with their husbands, in reality it is often the husband who ultimately decides, with the wife acquiescing to his opinions. As one woman recounted, her husband is the main decision-maker, and while most of the time they agree to make decisions together, in the end it is still the husband who makes decisions. Somewhat resignedly, she remarked that this is part of the culture and that men used to belittle her by saying, ‘You are a nothing women (meri nating). You don’t know anything, we men talk, you just listen.’ Another woman indicated that the term meri nating had been used in relation to her. This

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**Text Box 16: Cathy’s Story**

Cathy is a 51-year-old woman, with no children but two dependants. She has no formal education, because she grew up in a village in the bush and her parents didn’t send her to school. As a child she was expected to help her mother grow and sell garden crops. The key moral lesson her mother taught Cathy was not to roam and not to be idle. Her father would become violent towards her mother when she criticised him for wandering around. Cathy entered an arranged marriage after her future husband’s parents saw her. It was a church wedding and the bride price was K500 and eight pigs. Cathy has the main responsibility for growing and selling garden crops, primarily bulb onions, with her husband only helping her in the garden with planting sweet potato. They struggle to pay school fees but also offer some financial support for bride price and compensation to extended family members. Her husband is non-violent, but they have verbal arguments. An ongoing problem in the marriage is that Cathy’s husband plays cards and when she criticises this behaviour he becomes angry and they argue. The husband regularly takes half their income for his own personal use on cards and cigarettes. He is the main decision-maker in the household and Cathy regards this as appropriate because as the man he is rightly the head of the household. The husband makes decisions about land use and the disciplining of children, but he and Cathy make decisions about the education of the children and income expenditure. For Cathy a good aspect of her relationship with her husband is that they support each other in regard to money and compensation (although they also argue about similar matters). She appreciates that her husband has a humble attitude and Cathy regards him as generally behaving well towards her.
44-year-old woman with four children, who has since separated from her violent husband, said that when they were together he would make all the household decisions, wanting her to submit to him and seeing her as a meri nating. The designation of meri nating devalues and negates the substantial contributions that women make to their households and is assuredly very wounding for women.

However, the husband being the main decision-maker does not always indicate a dysfunctional marriage or that the husband is overbearing, for it was also common in marriages which wives characterised as ‘good’. One woman remarked that her husband asks her opinion on decisions and they discuss things together but, in the end, he follows his own decisions even if they had agreed on something else. At other times she acquiesces to decisions even though he has not discussed things with her, since she considers that he makes the right decisions for the family. She said he is very good as a husband and treats her well and is one of the few men in Chimbu who does household chores. This example suggests that gender norms, both local and introduced, are influential in how women conceive of a ‘good’ marriage. This usually requires the husband to be the head of the house and for the wife to submit to his will.55

**Women’s Decision-Making**

We found some cases where women had considerable decision-making power, including one woman who said there was no violence in her marriage, her husband was not dominating and they lived well together. She regarded her marriage as a mutually respectful relationship, attributing this to their shared Christian values, and she is the decision-maker regarding land use, money and their children’s education and discipline. She commented that although her husband does not talk much she listens to him. She holds and controls the income and makes the decisions about what the money will be spent on and does not seek or need her husband’s permission for any expenditure. Despite her unusual power in decision-making and control of income, she held rather conservative beliefs about what constitutes a good wife, saying that, ‘a good wife stays at home and looks after her husband and children by doing the domestic chores and managing the family’s money’. Though there was no physical violence in the marriage, she also made some broader comments about wives reducing the risk of violence from husbands by spending the money they earn at the market wisely and not socialising with other men. Women, as noted, often place the onus on themselves to diminish or prevent violence. Rather than the perpetrators taking responsibility for their violence, this falls on women as shown by this woman’s statement about women’s need to be self-policing in order to reduce the risk of violence.

There were also situations where the absence of the husband meant that decision-making within the household fell mainly to women. One woman described her rather dysfunctional marriage, which was free from violence, saying that she made most decisions because her husband does not stay at home. She remarked that her husband does not care for her; does not help at home or in the garden and goes out wherever he wants. Evidently he treats her in this way because she has not given him children. She suspects that he has been going out with other women but cannot do anything about it. In addition to general decision-making, she decides how to spend money, since income generation falls wholly on her and her husband has no income. Even though she gets angry with him for his neglect, he never beats or swears at her as is often the case with other men in Chimbu.

Another respondent also described a situation where she was the main decision-maker because her husband was absent. This 45-year-old woman, Julia (Text Box 14, p. 40), with six children, said she makes decisions about land use, income expenditure and the education and disciplining of her children. Another woman, Fiona (Text Box 17, p. 44), described making all the decisions in her household, because her husband rarely contributes to the household and neglects his responsibilities.
Other Family Decision-Making

It should be noted that decision-making is not always restricted to the husband and wife, but sometimes involves other members of the immediate family, such as children, or extended family members, including blood relatives and in-laws. In one case, the husband’s brother was sometimes involved in decision-making, though it was unclear what type of decisions he participated in and, in another case, the husband’s parents had a role in decision-making about land. Another woman who is separated from her husband makes decisions with her two daughters.

In some cases, the authority shifts from the husband to an eldest son — for example, the decision-making shifted in one household because the husband was jailed for growing marijuana. While the husband made the decisions before he went to jail, he has not returned to the village on his release, resentful because his wife did not visit him when he was in prison. Now their eldest son has occupied the position of head of household and tells his mother to stay home and do the gardening and not go to town because it is expensive. She has some decision-making power over health, education and resources, though the eldest son also joins in making decisions about the spending of money.

Joint Decision-Making

One woman who left her first husband who was an alcoholic, said that in her second marriage she and her husband respect each other, discuss things together and make decisions jointly.

However, joint decision-making does not necessarily mean that the marriage is based on mutual respect and equality. This was certainly the case with one woman, Kristina (see Text Box 18), who despite making decisions...
together with her husband about discipline and education of their children, was subject to violence when she asked her husband to contribute (both financially and in the garden) to the household.

Text Box 18: Kristina’s Story

Kristina is 45 years old and has seven children. She dropped out of school at grade 6 and has been married twice. When she was growing up in a Christian family, Kristina was well treated by her parents, who favoured girls because they were ones who stayed with parents until they married. She had one child in her first marriage, which Kristina considers was good until her husband got a job and he started to spend his income on alcohol and other women. This meant he did not share his income with Kristina and the marriage broke down when he married another woman. Kristina’s second marriage also has problems. Although her husband makes some money from selling pigs, he does not contribute financially to the household, neither does he contribute to work in the home or garden. He beats Kristina when she asks him to contribute money to the family and to save money rather than spending it on alcohol, and also beats her when she asks him to help with the garden. They make decisions together about discipline and education of their children, but Kristina also makes independent decisions about children and their welfare, discipline, health, education and the household food. She makes decisions about money with her husband but she also saves money in a tin that he doesn’t know about and this is spent on the household, including on food, the children’s education and bride price contributions. They have both completed an Oxfam training course and while some of the problems in the marriage have lessened Kristina still does not receive any support from her husband.

Financial Decision-Making

Household Income Management

It can be either the husband or the wife who actually looks after the household’s money. While decisions about pooled income are sometimes made jointly, several women indicated that their spouses were solely responsible for decisions about pooled money. Indeed, in some cases it appeared to be more akin to the husband seizing the wife’s earnings, so that he could control it.

The husband mentioned above, who demands his wife submit to him when she tries to contribute to decision-making, is also rather overbearing about financial matters. He pools the family money each fortnight, does a budget and then tells her what to buy, slapping her if she does not follow what he says. In another example, the husband is the decision maker on all fronts, including land, income and the disciplining and education of the children, though the respondent said that she does intervene and speak if she believes the husband is making the wrong decision. She regards it as a man’s role and right to hold the money and make the decisions about how it is spent since she believes that women ‘shouldn’t contribute in decision making’. The husband gets angry with her if she does not seek his permission for expenditure, even though it is always for her family. He has on occasion spent all the money on beer and cigarettes and when she has questioned him about this he gets angry, but not physically violent.

In some cases, husbands take control of household income even when they have failed to contribute any money to the household. One respondent, Sally-Anne (Text Box 12, p. 38), whose violent husband has no income and only occasionally contributes to income earning, nevertheless takes control of the income his wife earns. The husband makes all the decisions, with his wife only occasionally contributing. If she earns money at the market she is expected to take it straight home and hand it over to her husband. Some income is held in a joint savings
account to which both have independent access. Sally-Anne is expected to ask permission for any expenditure, whether it is to spend cash immediately after it is earned at the market or by withdrawing money from their joint bank account. However, both husband and wife do spend money without telling each other; behaviour that is viewed negatively by both partners and leads to conflict. Because her husband would not consult her about his spending for his own benefit but would beat her if she did not consult him about her own spending, Sally-Anne exercised agency once by refusing to tend the garden cash crops if he continued to do so.

In some cases, even though the husband decides how income is to be spent, women have a say in other decisions. One woman said that her husband makes decisions about money and land, but she is involved in decision-making with him about their children’s education, welfare and discipline. This was also the situation with a 35-year-old woman with four children who decides together with her husband on how to look after the family and earn money, but he alone decides how to spend the money they have earned. The husband is responsible for decisions concerning the children but both decide about health and education matters. Although he seems to consider himself the head of the household, he helps his wife with household chores and looking after the children. There was some violence early in their marriage, though the reason is not clear. Today, she remarked, they do not argue or fight, but she admitted that she gets angry when he comes back from market with less money than expected due to low demand.

One respondent, whose income comes mainly from remittances from her daughter and the sale of onions, said that her husband looks after the cash they have when at home, but leaves it with her when he goes to work. While the money benefits the whole family, he makes decisions about its expenditure. The husband has a bank account and since the daughter's remittances are paid into that account, the wife has to ask her husband’s permission to access it.

Women in Control of Pooled Income

A small number of women indicated that they were responsible for looking after pooled money. In some cases, women had exclusive decision-making power over this money, but in others such decisions were made jointly. Whether women held exclusive decision-making power depended on whether the income was mainly produced by them. This was the case with one 45-year-old woman with five children. Even though her husband was responsible for most decisions in the household, she decided how their money was spent, because she earned almost all of it. Her husband does not have an income and only gives some support in her income generating activities.

In a similar case, a respondent said that although her husband is the main decision-maker, she looks after the money. Usually she and her husband agree to make decisions together but ultimately, she said, men make the decisions in their culture and justify this by referring to women as inconsequential (meri nating). This woman’s husband was shot while in Bougainville and is disabled and so she does the work that is usually the responsibility of men. She referred to her husband as a quiet person, who never tries to control her and who never fights or beats her badly. However, when she ‘talks a lot’ about things to do with the family he sometimes slaps her. While they both decide how to spend their money, she looks after it. She recounted how in the past he would lie about his earnings and what he spent his money on but has improved.

A positive report came from a 28-year-old woman who said that she is mainly responsible for income generation since her husband has no source of income. She and her husband do not fight, he does not control or beat her and they work together and make decisions together. Decisions about finances are made together but she looks after the money.

Another respondent also reported positively that her husband is a good person who never shouts or screams at her; does not beat or argue with her; and when he earns money he gives it to her to look after. They make decisions together about money, health, education and resources but the husband is solely responsible for decisions about the children.
Another woman also reported that she controls the pooled household income. Her husband often undertakes the marketing of their garden produce and when he returns from the market he gives her all the money. When he asks for money she always gives it to him and tries to counsel him not to do things that will affect their income generation. They discuss together how the money is to be spent, which is mainly on household needs. However, on occasion he has spent money on beer and when drunk he is argumentative and destroys things in the house. She said that there are no problems with her husband, that he looks after the family well and understands what she does as a woman in the family and the workload she carries.

Yet another respondent reported joint decision-making about pooled income with the funds in the wife’s control, saying that her husband is ‘good’, never treats her badly, respects her, helps her with her work and, indeed, treats her ‘like a sister’. They never fight or argue and they work together in the garden or on housework. She is responsible for marketing and when she returns she shows her husband the money. She takes care of their money, but her husband knows how much they have and they both decide how it will be spent. Despite the equity in financial decision-making, the husband usually makes other household decisions, though both of them are responsible for decision-making about their children, health and education.

In a small number of marriages, the wife controls the finances because the husband cannot be trusted with the money, having a record of misusing it. This was the case with a 60-year-old woman who said that despite both spouses being involved in decisions about money (as well as education and food), she holds the money because he has misused it in the past.

**Independent Income Management**

Independent income management is a way of women keeping control of their own earnings. While this is usually a smaller amount than pooled income would be, it gives women more control over its expenditure, as in regard to this money they are usually the sole decision-maker. When income is pooled, women often need their spouse’s approval, even when they have contributed most of the labour towards earning it.

We found a small number of cases where couples manage their income independently of each other. In some cases, it appears that women pool some of their income but keep some for themselves (see below, pp. 49–50). Husbands who manage their own income independently also sometimes contribute some of this to the household, though their contributions are invariably less than their wives. One woman described how her main source of income was garden produce and pigs at the market. She controls the money she earns herself and spends it on household items to benefit her family. When her husband earns money, he shares some of it with her. His source of income is evidently irregular, though he does manage to save some money which he keeps separately. His wife said that he is ‘better at’ saving money than she is, but he refuses to tell her what he is saving for. She is unable to save because she directs her income to supporting the family. Her husband is able to save for himself because he gives only some of his money to the household. In other words, he takes advantage of her earning capacity.

Clearly, independent income management allows men to contribute minimal amounts or opt out entirely of contributing to the household. This was the case with Fiona (Text Box 17, p. 44) who she said she is responsible for all decision-making in the household because her husband fails to fulfil his responsibilities and never shares money with her. Mostly the household costs fall on her and she remarked that she only began selling garden produce (brown onions) because her husband did not contribute to the household. She keeps control of the money she earns and spends it as she sees fit.

**Combined Household and Independent Income Management**

The different methods of decision-making regarding income are not mutually exclusive but may operate in combination. A small number of households use both household income management and independent income management. In some cases, this is clearly weighted against the women.
For example, one couple, who share decisions about welfare, discipline, health and education, decide together how the wife is to spend the money she earns, but the husband decides alone how he spends the money he earns. All of the wife’s income from selling garden produce at the market is spent on food and other necessities to benefit the children and to sustain the household. She also contributes money, food and pigs to her husband’s family of origin. So, household income management is practised in regard to the wife’s income and independent income management in regard to his own. This man also becomes violent if she asks him to tell her about his earnings and to contribute resources to the home by sharing his money with her (see p. 51).

Suzanne (Text Box 19), whose marriage entails physical violence by both partners, holds and controls the money she earns at the market and does not need anyone’s permission to use it. However, because both partners take turns to sell at the market, one or the other has control of that source of income. Sometimes the husband will give Suzanne some of his takings from the market, but he wastes considerable money on alcohol, gambling and other women.

Text Box 19 — Suzanne’s Story

Suzanne is 31 years old and has two children. She was the last born of four children and the parents treated sons and daughters equally. Suzanne was raised with Christian values and was taught to attend church, be a charitable community member and share food with others, to speak respectfully to others and not become aggressive or express anger. She finished grade 10 at school and was keen to train as an elementary teacher but could not afford the fees. Suzanne married a man she met at school. After completing grade 10 they both returned to their homes, where they had a relationship for two years before marrying. The bride price was K2000 and six pigs. Suzanne says they live well together and that it is a mutually respectful relationship, but there are also conflicts caused mainly by the husband’s recurring resource-depleting behaviour, absences, infidelities and violence. The main source of their violent conflicts is the mutual perception that the other partner is not meeting their domestic work responsibilities. The problems start when, for example, Suzanne asks him to help in the garden and he does not, so when he comes home she beats him with a stick. The husband is violent towards Suzanne when, for example, she hasn’t cleared the garden or looked after the pigs. Another source of violent conflict is the husband’s absences from the home, alcohol consumption, gambling, sexual relationships with other women and possible unconfirmed marriages to them, as well as giving them money. The problems start when he goes out playing snooker and drinking and giving money to other women and stays away from home for two or three nights. When he comes home Suzanne beats him.

Male Control of Joint Income

In some instances of combined income management, the husband controls the pooled income, as described by one 54-year-old respondent with five children. Her husband mainly decides about children, health and education and how much to contribute to customary obligations, but they make decisions about finances jointly. However, although she claims that their decisions about money are jointly made, she says that she submits to him because he is her husband, so that financial decision-making is effectively in his hands. The husband holds the money, which is spent on the household. She keeps the extra income she makes by selling beans separate from the money her husband holds and does not get his permission to use this, though it is generally spent on family needs.
Despite overbearing husbands, some women keep control of some of their income and manage this separately from the household money in the control of their husband, as described above. A 37-year-old woman with five children (discussed above, p. 42) is bossed around by her domineering husband who keeps control of most of the household earnings and decides how it will be spent. Although he has changed since becoming a member of a Pentecostal church, in the past he would spend money on playing cards and ‘street women’. She keeps the tiny amount she earns by selling items at a local village market and spends it on household needs (such as soap and cooking oil), as so many women unfailingly do.

One 33-year-old respondent reported that her husband is the main decision-maker in the household and if she tries to contribute, he tells her she must submit to him. He also tells her to listen to him so that their marriage will be strong and though she used to talk back to him she no longer does. He is also in control of income each fortnight and does a budget, telling her what to buy and if she does not follow his demands, he slaps her. Still, she keeps the money she earns from her harvest separately and spends it as she wishes.

A 24-year-old respondent with four children reported that her husband looks after the family well and doesn’t fight. They jointly make decisions and agree to help each other, though the husband decides how to spend the money that they earn, mostly on household needs. Most of their income comes from selling garden produce (brown onions) and her husband often travels to Lae, Goroka and Madang to sell them. She also makes her own money by selling bush greens, sweet potato, corn and beans and sometimes plays cards and wins money. With this money, which she keeps separate, she does not ask her husband’s permission, but it is spent on household needs, such as soap, rice and cooking oil.

In some cases, male control of joint income is accompanied by violence. This was the case with Kristina (Text Box 18, p. 45) whose husband earns money from a number of sources but spends it on alcohol or other amusements. Kristina reported that he sometimes gives her money for household expenditure but when he has spent his money on alcohol he demands her money, beating her if she refuses. He also beats her if she asks him to contribute money to the family, to save money rather than spending it on alcohol, and to help with the garden. She saves money in a tin at home that the husband is unaware of and she spends this on household needs.

In some cases, the husband being in charge of pooled money is indicative of a dysfunctional marriage in which the husband dominates, but not always. There are marriages where the husband looks after joint money in what appears to be an equitable, non-violent and respectful way. For example, a 24-year-old woman with one child reported that when she and her husband sell vegetables they both decide how the income will be spent, but her husband looks after the money. Like the married couple above, she said that her husband treats her well and they never fight or argue, both listening to each other. Because her husband does not help her with the growing and selling of sweet potato, she keeps this income for herself, though it is generally spent on buying small things for the house, such as soap, or sometimes she saves until she has enough to purchase clothes. Another woman reported a similar arrangement, though with one limitation. This 20-year-old woman with two children said that she and her husband live happily together; he treats her and the children well, shares what he earns and never beats her or swears at her. Even though he looks after the money, they make decisions together about how it should be spent although with the limitation that she must ask her husband’s permission if she wants to spend joint money. She keeps her money separate from her husband’s and spends it on food as well as contributing to joint savings, which they intend to use for roofing iron. Much as in Jiwaka, the women of Chimbu often consider a marriage good if it is free from violence, even though it includes forms of inequality and domination.

**Women’s Control of Joint Income**

Among those using a combination of income management methods, there were some instances of the pooled money being looked after by the wife.
A 32-year-old woman, with three children, said her husband looked after the family well, describing him as a good husband and saying he never beats her. He works as a carpenter, buys clothes for the children and shares his money with her. She looks after the household money but they both decide how it will be spent, which is on family needs, such as store food, clothes, salt, cooking oil and soap. She earns money which she keeps separate from the household money.

Some women are in control of pooled money in a strategy of risk minimisation to prevent the husband from spending it on alcohol or other resource depleting activities. For example, a woman who looks after the pooled money said that she and her husband sit down together and decide how to use it and this benefits the whole family. Sometimes she asks his permission about spending but at other times she just spends the money, especially when it is for essential household needs. She explained that she earns income so that she has money to contribute to customary obligations, such as bride price and compensation as well as family needs. She also keeps some of her own money separate so that her husband does not misuse it on beer. She comes under pressure from her husband's family who complain when she markets and now has a conscious strategy of sharing whatever she earns from sales with them and buying things for them.

Conflicts over Money

Conflicts over money can become physically violent though violence is also triggered by other causes. Conflicts relating to a woman’s engagement in the economy often occur because the husband expects full control of all the income that his wife generates. However, while only she is expected to ask permission for any spending, conflict also occurs when the husband spends money without telling his wife.

For example, a respondent, who does not experience violence, reported that she must tell her husband about all earnings and expenditure. When she goes to the market her spouse tells her not to spend the money but bring it home and show him. While she looks after the money, they both decide on spending together. He makes most decisions in the household but they both make decisions about children, health and resources.

In some cases, husbands do not contribute to the household because they do not earn any income, relying instead on their spouses’ income generating activities, often giving minimal or no labour support to their wives. Unlike many of the women interviewed in Chimbu who indicated their husbands had some form of income, Sally-Anne’s (Text Box 12, p. 38) husband does not, relying wholly on her for money. Sally-Anne considered that her husband looked after her well, though the reality of their relationship paints a picture of a dictatorial and violent spouse. Although Sally-Anne carries a far heavier workload, he has all the power, which he enforces with physical violence. The couple have a joint savings account to which they both have independent access. She is expected to ask permission for any expenditure, whether it is spending cash immediately after it is earned at the market or by withdrawing money from the joint bank account.

Conflicts and violence over money and income-generation are very common and can be divided into four broad categories: 1) husbands not contributing financially to the household; 2) husbands demanding money from their wives; 3) women deemed not working hard enough or earning enough; and 4) women not completing household responsibilities due to income generation.

1) Husbands not contributing financially to the household: Husbands’ failure to contribute financially to the household has two aspects. First, the husband may withdraw contributions because his wife begins to earn an income which can support the household. Second, as also in Jiwaka, sometimes it is not a question of husbands withdrawing contributions to the household, because they did not contribute in the first place. It is very common that when wives ask their husbands to contribute to the household, they are met with violence, as in the case of Vera, mentioned previously (Text Box 15, p. 41). Throughout her second marriage, Vera’s husband has refused to contribute any money or labour to the household, using violence when she asks him to contribute money to help sustain the household.
Another woman, who has been married twice and separated once, said that her first husband took two further wives against her wishes. He responded to her objections with violence and favoured his subsequent wives, and so she left him and married again. Unfortunately, her second husband also responds with violence if she asks him about his earnings and to contribute resources to the home by sharing his money with her. The first violent incident occurred when he went to sell potatoes at the market and when he returned he refused to tell her how much he had earned. She became angry about this and he responded with violence, giving her a nosebleed. Now to avoid violence from her husband she submits to his will and no longer asks him to contribute to the household.

2) Husbands demanding money from their wives: It is common for husbands to demand money from their wives, often to fund their own resource depleting behaviour. As is already clear, such behaviour is often a source of tension and contention in households, and domestic arguments and violence often arise as a consequence of men’s self-indulgence. While we found a few cases where women behaved in this way, overwhelmingly it is men who engage in it. The range of resource depleting behaviour is also much smaller for women, comprising only gambling, whereas for men it includes gambling, snooker, cigarettes and betel nut, alcohol and other women. Men’s resource depleting behaviour is contested by women who challenge the men to direct the money to the household to meet family needs, rather than for their own pleasure.

A number of women reported that their husband would spend money on other women. One woman, whose husband was very dictatorial in the household, said she was left at home to look after the children while he went out to CD houses and dances, where he spends money on playing cards and ‘street’ women. Another woman, who has since separated from her husband, recounted how he never gave her money, but he would go out drinking with other women and spend money on them. Another woman has also left her husband because he went out with other women and made them pregnant. In addition to being violent to her, he would give money to the other women and sometimes when he came home drunk he would break household items. Men spending money on other women to the exclusion of their own family also generates a lot of conflict in households. In cases of polygyny, the husband favouring one wife over another can see the marriage dissolve. Kristina (Text Box 18, p. 45) who is in her second marriage, reported that her first marriage was good but changed when her husband got a job, since he failed to contribute financially to the household, spending the money he earned on alcohol and other women and refusing to give any to her. He married another woman and this led to the dissolution of Kristina’s marriage to him. The husband of Sally-Anne, mentioned above, sometimes spends some of the money earned mainly by his wife on purchases or activities solely for his own enjoyment, which Sally-Anne only learns about when she sees that the balance of their account is less than she had expected. Sally-Anne has also sometimes withdrawn money to spend on herself or her family of origin but her husband beats her for the very behaviour he engages in. Another woman’s husband is intermittently violent when she engages in resource depleting behaviour; even though he engages in this kind of behaviour himself (Text Box 19, see p. 48).

There are also cases where husbands who contribute no income to the household demand money from their partners. For example, Cathy (Text Box 16, p. 42) reported that her husband has no source of income but relies on her earnings for his discretionary spending. Cathy receives little or no help from her husband when it comes to income generation but he regularly takes half of the income she earns for his own personal use. Cathy holds the other half of the income to spend on the family’s immediate needs, as well as to support others in paying bride price and compensation. Cathy’s husband’s self-indulgent spending and gambling is an ongoing problem in the marriage; when Cathy criticises this behaviour he becomes angry and they have verbal arguments, though these do not involve violence.
Mary (see Text Box 20) reported similarly that her husband no longer works and lives off her earnings, using violence against her when she does not give him money, which he spends on other women. Mary was raised as a Christian and taught to forgive, be humble and not fight with her husband and so she continues in the marriage and mitigates the violence by complying with his demands.

3) Women deemed not working hard enough or earning enough: The Chimbu and the Jiwaka case studies have some similarities but also some significant differences. Several Chimbu women indicated that their income generating activities, especially their trips to market, are a source of conflict and violence, and we found examples of husbands beating their wives if they feel they are not working hard enough or have not made enough money at market. We found no such cases in Jiwika.

Suzanne’s husband (Text Box 19, p. 48) beats her when he thinks she is not doing enough work in the garden or tending the pigs properly, both of which are income earning activities. Suzanne is also aggressive towards her husband, attacking him with a stick when she believes he is not giving enough help in the garden. Other sources of violent conflict are her husband’s absences from home, alcohol consumption, gambling, sexual relationships with and possible marriages to other women, and giving money to them. Sometimes he stays away from home for two or three nights and when he returns Suzanne beats him.

The husband of another woman beats her when she returns from the market if he deems that she has not earned enough money or is withholding some of the earnings. She reported that the only way to avoid being beaten on her return from market is to bring all the money she has earned to him and show it to him. Her husband holds and controls the money she earns at market, makes decisions about how it is spent and she must ask his permission for any expenditure. On some occasions, he has prevented her from going to the market and the produce that was readied for sale has wasted. This woman also suffers violence if she questions her husband about unnecessary expenditure. Despite the violence, she says that her husband treats her well by buying food for the family and a good aspect of his behaviour is that ‘he doesn’t beat me all the time’. The women of Chimbu evaluate a good marriage differently from the women of Bougainville, where we found that a good marriage is defined by the level of communication and joint decision-making. The bar is much lower in Chimbu, where violence alone is generally the sole criterion that defines a marriage as bad — or even, as this woman suggests, not being beaten all the time.
Sally-Anne’s (Text Box 12, p. 38) husband routinely uses violence against her for many reasons: if she has not done as much work in the garden or in looking after the children as he thinks she should have; if she speaks crossly to him; and if she does not make a profit at market or spends money on her family of origin without his permission. This violence is a long-established aspect of their marriage. Once when Sally-Anne had spent a considerable amount of money on purchasing a bag of food and had also sustained the costs of transport and market fees, she was unable to sell all the produce at the market and so made a loss. Sally-Anne then delayed going home to avoid being beaten by her husband, though this did not prevent violence. For Sally-Anne, the only strategy to avoid violence is to completely submit to her husband’s will by not making any purchases herself and returning home immediately after a day at the market, giving him any earnings and explaining to him all the sales and profits for that day.

4) Women not completing household responsibilities due to income generation: If income generating activities interfere with women’s domestic and childcare responsibilities, some husbands react violently. That is, women who go to the markets to sell produce face the risk of violence from husbands who may regard them as being away from the home too much or neglecting domestic duties. A number of women indicated that being late home from market and not being able to fulfil their domestic and childcare responsibilities led to violence from their spouses. One woman commented that women working at the market and travelling to and from the markets may be late home and so are beaten by their husbands.

This was the case with Julie (Text Box 14, p. 40) whose husband teaches at a school elsewhere and who is only occasionally at home. When he is at home, he treats Julie relatively well as long as she does not disagree with him. However, if he has been drinking he criticises Julie and then physically attacks her and the children, being particularly angry that she has chosen to stay in the village rather than accompanying him to where he is teaching. As Julie reported, he says such things as: ‘You don’t even come to where I am teaching and stay with me and cook food or wash clothes.’ If the time Julie spends at the market earning money leaves her with insufficient time to do all her domestic and child-raising tasks in what her husband regards as a timely manner, he becomes verbally aggressive towards Julie and argues with her for not preparing food for the children early enough.

Sally-Anne, mentioned above, also suffers violence for perceived neglect of domestic duties. Because the work in the garden for income generation is tiring, it may result in her doing less housework, which enrages her husband, who beats her.

Attempts to Reduce the Risk of Violence

Female respondents gave a variety of reasons why their spouses are violent towards them, including refusing sex, talking too much or the husband being drunk. It is clear from some of the examples discussed above that women engage in conscious strategies to reduce the risk of conflict and violence. For example, Sally-Anne avoided violence by avoiding making purchases herself, returning home immediately from the market, explaining the day’s sales clearly to her husband and giving him the money earned. Julie is able to minimise, or avoid, her husband’s complaining that she has not completed domestic and maternal duties after being at the market, by buying cigarettes and beer on her way back home from the market to appease him. Another woman also stressed that if she markets and spends any of the earnings, she is careful to explain to her husband exactly what she spent the money on.

Even women whose relationship appears relatively good on the surface, with no apparent violence or conflict, circumscribe their behaviour and defuse their spouses’ anger by being careful to explain how much money they made and how much they spent. Other women are careful to share incomes and to make financial decisions together with their spouse, to alleviate the potential for conflict. Others consider that spending money wisely and only on family needs is necessary to avert conflict. One woman, who experiences conflict from her
husband’s family, said she reduces this risk of violence by sharing whatever she earns with them, buys things for them, feeds them and gives her husband money or support whenever he needs it.

Some women help each other in the garden and at the market and offer each other advice about how to manage potential conflict and violence over money. Sometimes the advice is not helpful, such as one woman being advised by other women to earn more at market to solve the problem of her husband beating her.

One woman who said she does not face any problems with her husband, told us that one time after he had made some money from selling onions he came home drunk and they argued. She made the point that when she tries to talk about something wrong that he has done, such as drinking beer, she only rebukes him one time. She remarked, however, that some other women simply do not talk, or do not talk back, to their husbands when they waste money, so as minimise the risk of conflict and violence.
PART 3. LESSONS LEARNED

What Does the Research Tell Us?

Women’s Income Generation

The women of Jiwaka and Chimbu provinces work exceedingly hard in difficult conditions to meet the needs of their families. While women value their ability to generate income and being able to improve the material conditions of their lives, this is not without disadvantages, with many women being severely overburdened with work. Numerous women reported an increased workload, that they had insufficient rest and consequently were tired and weak. Women also disliked the fact that earning money comes with increased demands from relatives and affines. Some women said marital problems and their unsupportive husbands impacted on their ability to earn money.

Many of the income generating activities promoted through livelihood programs impose undue and unrealistic social and economic burdens on women. To realise cash opportunities, women have to try to access markets that are virtually inaccessible. The scope of economic activity undertaken by the women interviewed was often limited, with most women relying on only one way of making money. For example, the women of Jiwaka and Chimbu rely overwhelmingly on the sale of garden produce for their livelihoods. One problem several women highlighted was that they were not always able to sell their produce at markets because too many women there are trying to sell the same thing. While the issues confronting income generation vary according to research site, overall this mode of selling is hampered by a lack of product diversity and lack of adequate infrastructure, such as safe and clean markets. Due to the general poverty of their customer base, these markets have limited scope to support product diversification and women lack resources, such as capital, for entrepreneurship. Clearly scope exists for business development initiatives that not only provide capital for women to establish micro-businesses, but work with them to develop their basic business and financial management skills. One of the biggest constraints to women’s income generation is access to markets, and hence development programming is needed that supports connection to markets (through logistical support, connecting with buyers and brokers in major towns and urban centres or facilitating communal transport so that women can pool resources to transport goods to markets).

An implication of the research findings is that much more work needs to be done by development practitioners to ensure that livelihood programs are actually economically worthwhile for the participants. In many instances the income generating activities women engage in are quite marginal, with large amounts of labour being expended for minimal economic returns. The burden this often imposes on women raises questions about the costs, of which violence is a major example, but which also include, as noted above, overwork, fatigue and ill health, and poor returns.

Constraints to Bargaining in the Household

A much larger implication of the research findings is that much more work needs to be done by development practitioners to ensure that livelihood programs and initiatives that promote income generation are actually empowering rather than simply giving women access to economic resources. The emphasis of much women’s economic empowerment programming is simply on giving women opportunities for income generation and so is really about their economic advancement. As explained earlier, women’s economic empowerment is defined as much more than an increase in women’s access to resources and assets (Hunt and Samman 2016:7; see also Taylor and Pereznieto 2014:1). Women’s economic empowerment requires an increase in women’s power and agency, so that they have increased control over other areas of their lives (see Mayoux 1999b:959). Too often, women’s economic empowerment programming is based on the assumption that increasing access to resources
and assets will enable women to renegotiate relationships in the household, or that financial independence will enable them to leave dysfunctional and violent relationships. Gender and development scholars have questioned the assumption that an increase in her earning capacity enables a woman to renegotiate the unpaid care work she has been performing at home. As noted above, leaving a husband is not often a viable option for women because they lose access to land on which they necessarily rely for food and income.

The material presented here makes it clear that most of the women respondents in Jiwaka and Chimbu are far from being empowered. This is despite the fact that the women interviewed had exposure to international NGOs (Oxfam), local NGOs (Voice for Change) and community-based organisations (IRRM and KGWAN), all of which have been engaged in gender programming as part of their livelihood programs work. The DNH PNG research shows clearly that intra-household inequality seldom changes when women bring money into the household because they are still expected to perform the customary domestic labour. Indeed, in some locations women were subjected to violence by their partners if they did not do so.

The DNH PNG research (and other DNH research in Bougainville and Solomons Islands) indicates that whether women are able to negotiate a more equitable sharing of housework with their partners depends largely on the cultural and gender norms that specify which work is appropriate for women and which for men (Garikipati 2012:729; Haile et al. 2012:258; Hanmer and Klugman 2016:240). In her influential critique of bargaining in the household, Bina Agarwal argues that very little, if any, attention is being given to gender asymmetries or to the complex range of factors, especially qualitative ones, that might determine bargaining power within a household — for example, the influence of social norms and practices, the role of beliefs in the bargaining process, or the role of gender differences (1997:2). Agarwal points out that inequality among family members places some members in a weaker position relative to others in intra-household bargaining, with gender being a very significant basis of such inequality (ibid.:9).

Indeed, a recent ODI policy paper argues that achieving women’s economic empowerment requires not only building women’s capacities and skills but the removal of constraints that impinge on their empowerment (Hunt and Samman 2016:22). Economic empowerment requires a focus on the broader constraints imposed by restrictive gender and social norms which prevent women from achieving increased power and agency in their lives. Elisabeth Porter argues similarly that programs seeking to empower women need to confront the obstacles that ‘deny agents the capacity to make transforming choices, or block agents from acting on their choices’ (2013:10). Changing gender norms is not easy: even in OECD countries, women work on average over 20 hours per week more than men and continue to be disadvantaged by the amount of unpaid housework they do (OECD 2017). However, the situation in PNG is far more dire; there, gender norms impose constraints and demands on women that not only limit their choices, power and agency but also burden them with work to an excessive degree. Not only must they endure these harsh conditions, but their children suffer as well because they cannot give them the care and attention they should receive.

Despite women in Jiwaka and Chimbu contributing financially to the household, they have rarely been able to negotiate a reduction of other responsibilities. That domestic labour still falls overwhelmingly on women reflects the gender norms which prescribe a particular division of labour and gender roles, relegating women to the domestic sphere and the types of labour associated with it. There is considerable pressure to conform to gender norms and roles, particularly for women. Indeed, women who breach those norms are subject to sanctions, sometimes entailing the use of violence (see Jewkes 2002). During the DNH PNG research, particularly in Chimbu, instances were reported of men beating their wives because they had failed to do domestic labour. However, there is a double-standard in place; men are not subject to sanction or violence if they do not perform their own gender ascribed labour, which is occurring more and more. Previously, there was a clear gender division of labour in agricultural work, which allocated certain tasks to men, but today women are doing the majority of agricultural labour, including those kinds of labour that were traditionally the
responsibility of men. The exchange of bride price is also contributing to the increased work burden of women. This is especially the case where the inflation occurring in the amounts exchanged can mean that thousands of kina must be reciprocated to those who contributed to the bride price payment. As increasing numbers of men are opting out of contributing labour to the household, women are left to bear the burden of repaying these debts.

Achieving women’s economic empowerment requires changes on many levels, including within individuals, in communities and institutions, in markets and value chains and in the wider political and legal environment (Hunt and Samman 2016:9). Women’s economic empowerment requires an enabling environment — that is, programming that not only seeks to remove constraints but contains positive measures to enable women’s economic empowerment. For women to achieve economic empowerment, it is necessary to address a wide range of discriminatory gender norms which act as constraints on their agency, such as women’s exclusion from household and community decision-making, their responsibility for unpaid care work, and the widespread acceptance of violence of all forms against women. Though it may appear difficult to change the norms and practices that underpin gender inequality, the post-contact period of Papua New Guinea’s history shows that change is possible. We also learned of some positive initiatives during the field research: some communities are developing community laws (see below) that include addressing violence against women, and village court officials, especially in Jiwaka, are taking a stand opposing violence against women and challenging some toxic forms of masculinity.

**Violence Erodes Women’s Agency and Power**

The definition of women’s economic empowerment used in this report emphasises that to achieve equality women need not only increased access to income, but also greater power and agency in their lives. It is only through a combination of economic advancement and increased power and agency that women are able to leverage better outcomes for themselves and their families (Golla et al. 2011:4). Despite some women reporting that they have a high degree of agency in making decisions in regard to the household and its finances, mostly consisting of income they have earned themselves, this does not often flow on to other dimensions of their relationship with their spouse.

Often they are disempowered in other ways — especially through violence. Personal freedom, including freedom from violence, is often used as an indicator for measuring empowerment and for gender equality. For example, Jeni Klugman and colleagues argue that: ‘Freedom from violence is an essential domain of agency both for its intrinsic value in asserting fundamental human rights and for its instrumental value in promoting gender equality’ (Klugman et al. 2014:63). If empowerment is about opening up options for women to exercise power and agency, then violence has the opposite effect. If freedom from violence is an essential domain of agency, then violence is a very clear example of the negation of women’s agency and an indicator of disempowerment.

The numerous accounts of violence we heard in Jiwaka and Chimbu confirm that when women bring economic resources into the household, they do not inevitably become more empowered or suffer less violence. More than in any other DNH research, the research in Jiwaka and Chimbu found that intimate partner violence is normalised. A key lesson to draw from the DNH PNG research is that women’s economic empowerment programming must focus beyond simply giving women access to economic opportunities. If women are to be truly empowered, gender norms and practices in the context of marital relationships must be challenged effectively.

An important implication of the research is that the design of women’s economic empowerment programs should avoid minimalist initiatives — that is, aiming simply to give women access to economic opportunities without any focus on gender and gender relations, especially the role of gender norms and practices in the context of marital relationships. Addressing women’s economic opportunities in isolation from other dimensions...
of their lives, including their household — where bargaining over resources takes place — can limit the overall gains possible for women.

**Women’s Access to Justice is Limited**

The research shows that in the PNG highlands women’s access to justice is limited by existing conditions, as described below. As reflected below, the presence of Voice for Change in Jiwaka means that the issue of access to justice arose far more frequently in Jiwaka than in Chimbu. In Chimbu, our informants said that few women report violent incidents to the police, few charges are laid and few cases are being heard in the district court. In Jiwaka, more women have recourse to the police, and occasionally to the court, partly due to the influence of Voice for Change, which supports women who are assaulted by their spouses to take their cases to the police.62

At both sites, women generally prefer to take their grievances to the village court because they are unfamiliar with the district court procedures and they lack confidence in the courtroom environment. One key informant in Jiwaka said that while many women go to the village court, only a few go to the police and those who do so rarely follow through with their complaint by testifying when their case is heard. Some women, she remarked, are sorry for their husbands, while others are nervous about standing up in the courtroom, since they will not have relatives to support them, unlike the village court where relatives are naturally present and can speak up. Also, reporting to the police and taking the matter to court does not always give satisfactory results. Indeed, as we indicated above, one woman in Jiwaka who was beaten by her husband sought justice through the district court system with no success.

Some women’s access to justice is thwarted by their spouses. One woman in Jiwaka reported that when her husband broke her arms she thought the police and judiciary were not strong enough and so she took the case to the village court, but her husband simply did not appear when the case was being heard. Another woman in Jiwaka, whose husband would beat her when she refused to give him her earnings from the market, reported his physical abuse to the police three times, but each time when they tried to arrest him he ran away. Indeed, it appears to be a strategy of some perpetrators to not attend the court or to avoid apprehension by running away when the police came to arrest them.

There are considerable risks to women in seeking justice, whether through informal or formal means, as it can result in more physical violence and other forms of abuse, as well as pressure from families to withdraw complaints. For example, a woman from Jiwaka, whose spouse was particularly brutal and who broke her nose and hand, said that although she went to the police and her husband was charged, it never went to court because she was too afraid of him. Sometimes, despite women going to the police, the situation does not change because some men are simply undeterred by this course of action. One woman in Jiwaka, for example, was supported by Voice for Change to go to the police yet although she claimed the relationship with her husband had improved as a consequence, he continued to beat her. Another woman, who said that her husband began to be violent when he wanted to take another wife, took him to the district court but he continued beating her; only stopping when he saw that their children were growing up, she said. Clearly the court had been ineffectual in stopping his violence. Another woman in Jiwaka took her husband to the district court for beating her; but said that nothing satisfactory resulted from it since he was not deterred from being violent. She concluded it is better for wives to avoid violence by sharing and discussing issues with their husbands and by budgeting their use of money. On the positive side, a small number of other women in Jiwaka reported a diminishment of physical violence after reporting their husbands’ violence to the police.

Another disincentive to lodging a complaint is that the women of Jiwaka and Chimbu must pay fees to the village court. As a woman in Jiwaka reported, she decided against taking her husband to the village court over his infidelity, because she said that they will not do anything unless they are given money, referring to the fees that are required for a case to be heard.
Some women in Jiwaka prefer to take their cases to the informal ‘Form 2 court’ (sometimes called ‘wanbel kot’ [literally one stomach] or ‘lida kot’ [leader court]), which involves the two parties meeting with community leaders to resolve or mediate the situation (see also Houghton 2014). Here the emphasis is on restorative justice, rather than the punitive justice of the formal system and no court fees are required. However, according to key informants in Jiwaka, this apparently advantageous option has a limited future because the Form 2 court is being abolished and those who continue to use it will face a K300 fine.

Some village court officials in Jiwaka interviewed during the fieldwork indicated that a high proportion of the cases they deal with are marital problems, including intimate partner violence. Mostly, the fault lies with the husband, they say. Village courts are empowered to level fines, ranging from K50 to K300, against perpetrators of violence (though not rape). If the perpetrator refuses to pay, he will be jailed for up to six months. Village courts can also order compensation, ranging from K200 to K2000, to be paid to the victim. One village court official said that in the case of a man hitting his wife and giving her a blood nose the village court where he officiates would impose a K300 fine and K2000 compensation. If a husband used a knife to cut his wife, this would be referred to the police. The village court officials work closely with the police and are empowered to issue preventive orders. Indeed, one village court official remarked that because the police are ‘strong’, things are changing.

Several of the village court officials we interviewed in Jiwaka had been through the ‘gender and domestic violence’ training run by Voice for Change, who are filling the vacuum, since the government has not undertaken village court training for ‘decades’, as one man remarked. Unfortunately, Voice for Change only covers three village courts of a total of 11 in South Wahgi LLG (Local Level Government), and it is therefore unlikely that many village court officials will be as enlightened as those we interviewed. Certainly, some human rights defenders are more sceptical about the efficacy of the village court system and whether outcomes for women are satisfactory. For example, one women’s rights defender in Jiwaka, a key informant who was formerly a police officer, said that village court decisions can be erratic and that access to justice for women ‘does not work’ (en i no wok) and women are not treated fairly. The fact that justice is elusive for women means that many women are reluctant to pursue cases through this forum. One issue this key informant saw was that the relatives of the victim are preoccupied with getting compensation, which does not necessarily reach the women who suffers physical abuse, remarking that they ‘forget’ about the woman. She also said that bribery is sometimes used by violent husbands and their relatives who pay off the magistrate to get a satisfactory outcome for the perpetrator.

Compared to Jiwaka, our interviews in Chimbu show that few women seek justice by going to the police for the violence they endure. At the first research site, they prefer the village court and at the second research site they prefer the ‘wanbel kot’, largely because the village court entails financial costs which they can ill afford. Despite Oxfam working with the two communities in Chimbu, intimate partner violence is common. Indeed, one respondent there said that violence arising from women’s earning activities was so prevalent that community leaders came together to discuss it, warning perpetrators of jail time if they continued to use violence against their spouses. More so than Jiwaka, violence against wives in Chimbu is often seen as legitimate by women themselves, with some women subscribing to the view that a husband is entitled to beat his wife if she does something wrong. This was particularly evident in the statement by one woman, who remarked that: ‘Most women who have been beaten by their husbands are lazy women who do not work and roam around and play cards.’

The women interviewed in Chimbu who reported having violent husbands usually had no support except for a few who were supported by family members. In a few instances there was community intervention, and in many cases women avoided violence through submission. That many women still often say they have good relationships with the men who beat them is clearly indicative of how normalised violence against women is in these communities. As with the case mentioned above where a woman from Jiwaka concluded that
violence can be avoided by sharing and discussing issues with the husband and by budgeting, many women in Chimbu saw the responsibility for violence as residing with women. Women see themselves as at fault and take responsibility for the violence by seeking to pacify, appease or submit to their partner (see above, pp. 35, 59). In contexts where many women see themselves to blame for violence, and other women blame them as well, they are less likely to seek justice, whether through informal or formal means.

Key Lessons from the Research

These research findings have suggested some key lessons to inform economic empowerment programming.

» working with men is necessary

» the need for community-based gender transformative programs

» women’s economic empowerment programming should adopt a ‘do no harm approach’.

Key Lesson — Working with Men is Necessary

One lesson to be drawn from the DNH PNG research is the importance of working with men. In the last decade or so, there has been a considerable focus in gender programming on working with men. Although existing initiatives working with men are valuable, there remains an unfilled need for initiatives that are specifically relevant to women’s economic empowerment and that highlight a different range of issues. Programs should include financial management and decision-making in the household, domestic labour and other caring responsibilities, workloads and the benefits to men and children of more cooperative gender relations.

Given the poor development outcomes for women and the high levels of violence they endure, a clear need exists for programs that work to improve the position of women. However, there are dangers if strategies are not in place to mitigate and manage male ‘backlash’. Such ‘backlash’ includes the perception of being excluded from the benefits that accrue to women as a result of development programming. One key informant, for example, remarked that all the training women receive is making women go on top and men say they are ‘down on the ground now (daun long graun nau)’. This suggests that men in Papua New Guinea tend to see power in terms of a ‘zero-sum game’, where increases in power for women add up to a loss of power for them. Men’s claim that bride price gives them complete ownership of women can be seen as an instance of this ‘backlash’, where the increasing talk of women’s rights and gender equality in the public domain leads men to respond with a discourse that seeks to negate such notions. In both Jiwaka and Chimbu men seek to justify their absolute control over women by citing the exchange of bride price through expressions such as ‘full price, full body’, as well as recourse to discourses of ‘tradition’ more generally.

Given this resistance to gains for women, it is obvious that initiatives that work with men are quite indispensable (see also Slegh et al. 2013). However, since women often accept gender norms that have negative outcomes for them, there is also a need for broader gender programming that addresses both men and women. Indeed, there is increasing recognition internationally that women’s economic empowerment programming needs to be more thoroughly integrated with community-based approaches and also with violence against women programs (Mejia et al. 2014; Taylor 2015).

Key Lesson — The Need for Community-Based Gender Transformative Programs

Women’s economic empowerment programming needs to embrace more fully a gender transformative approach. As a recent DFID Guidance Note says, gender transformative approaches should focus explicitly on tackling social norms around gender, power and violence, as well as broader ideas, attitudes and values around what it means to be a ‘real man’ or a ‘real woman’ (Alexander-Scott et al. 2016:10). Despite the long-term recognition of the role played by norms in justifying gender inequality and violence against women, it is only in the last few years that practitioners have focused on interventions that seek to transform these norms (Heise
and Manji 2016:1). This new focus is due to the realisation that focusing on norms is much more effective than interventions simply targeting attitude and behaviour change at the individual level (Alexander-Scott et al. 2016:17, 10).

Gender norms play an important role in determining whether women’s economic empowerment can translate into broader empowerment. Gender norms constrain women and inhibit their capacity to exhibit effective agency. They often limit women’s movement and where they are allowed to go. They can affect the ownership of physical assets, so that norms concerning land tenure and decision-making about land marginalise women. Gender norms that impede more equitable gender relations need to be challenged. In particular, the gender norms that give women disproportionate responsibility for domestic labour and caring in the household need to be challenged, for they contribute heavily to the unequal work burden that women carry.

Evidence suggests that shifting knowledge or individual attitudes based on norms is often not enough to shift behaviour. That is because norms are generally maintained by disapproval or approval from within the reference group, so that those who transgress such norms are likely to be sanctioned or punished by this group, while those who comply are more likely to be rewarded or applauded (Alexander-Scott et al. 2016:8). This was acknowledged by a key informant during the research when she commented that in some cases of men being in agreement with women exercising their rights, it is society that makes this difficult. After all, it is in communities that gender inequality is normalised and tolerated. Negative social and gender norms gain their authority through the community and so change must start there.

Since the constraints imposed by social and gender norms are beyond the level of the individual, a community-wide approach to change is essential. This must be firmly rooted in the specifics of that locality — its particular characteristics — its challenges, strengths, weaknesses, cultural norms and beliefs. Most, if not all, communities in Papua New Guinea have governance structures in place, which can provide entry points for programs. Such a community-based approach presents issues such as violence against women as the community’s responsibility, not as individual women’s problems (Michau 2007:104). Such an approach also sees men as part of the community and advocates addressing them as part of the community rather than in isolation. Thus, it recognises the necessity of going beyond working with individuals and sporadic community awareness activities if there is to be a meaningful impact in the way women are seen and valued (ibid.:97; Michau 2005:10). Michau argues that a comprehensive community mobilisation requires an approach that engages with every level of the community in a systematic and structured process. This means working ‘not just with individual women and men, but with their friends and family, the institutions they rely on for services and support, the media which inform them, the opinion leaders who shape public opinion, and the government officials who design and implement policy and legislation’ (Michau 2007:100). Also, for interventions to be effective, the focus needs to be on what is termed the reference group, particularly those key individuals in the reference group whose opinions matter most and who can help effect change (Alexander-Scott et al. 2016:8).

‘Changing community norms is a process, not a single event’ (Michau 2005:4). This means engaging with community members on a regular basis and with mutually reinforcing messages from a variety of sources over a sustained period of time, since this contributes to changing the climate in the community and building momentum for change (ibid.). To shift social norms, interventions must create new beliefs within the reference group, so that the collective expectations of the people important to the community allow new behaviours to emerge (Heise and Manji 2016:2). Although working to change social and gender norms requires concentrating on everyone in a community, it is important to identify with key initiators of change who are willing to lead this process. Perhaps most importantly, special attention must be paid to working with church leaders, village court officials and other leaders in local communities who can show by example that change is good and desirable.

The challenge in achieving women’s economic empowerment programming is to identify key ‘enablers’ or ‘building blocks’ that will have a pivotal, positive effect (Hunt and Samman 2016:9). Our Solomon Islands
DNH research showed that savings clubs are a useful convening mechanism, or vehicle, for women’s economic empowerment programming in communities, providing a potential pathway for community-based gender transformative programming (Eves and Lusby 2018). Such a model could be extended to Papua New Guinea where financial inclusion is low and conflicts over money are common. Savings clubs can, however, expose women to male backlash if gender transformative programming is not in place to mitigate this risk. Initiatives that target one group to the exclusion of others have the potential to create resentment and envy, fostering division and fracturing social capital rather than building it. Therefore, approaches which are inclusive of everyone in the community are vital.

Beyond addressing women’s financial exclusion and promoting income generation, these groups comprise a potential vehicle for empowering women more generally, enabling them to improve a wide range of practical skills, such as business acumen, financial management and administrative skills. They provide a safe and enabling space for women to develop skills, allowing them to build confidence and collectively explore and define their needs (Brislane 2014:15; Hunt and Samman 2016:19). Moreover, in a society where women are generally excluded from leadership roles, savings groups offer a forum for them to develop a range of leadership skills, such as public speaking, chairing meetings and organisational administration.

Women’s involvement in savings groups has also led to a broader acceptance by many men that women have organisational capabilities that have not been harnessed previously by the community. Even so, there remains an unrealised potential for women’s broader participation and leadership that should be fostered. The development of strategies and programming are needed to provide wider opportunities for women to further build their confidence and leadership skills, so that their participation in savings groups can be extended into the broader community and translated into ‘developmental leadership’ — that is, leadership that is focused on development outcomes. Savings clubs are also an ideal community development initiative because they do not require external funding in order to be established or to be sustainable (Brislane 2014:7). Further, savings clubs promote self-reliance and are an effective form of community development, since through the shared enterprise of working together they help build social capital among women in the community.

Since Christianity is central to the way in which most Papua New Guineans make sense of the world and since the churches are a pervasive influence in people’s daily lives, the churches are an obvious starting point for developing community-based gender transformative programs. Several mainstream churches have participated in programs such as the Church Partnership Program which has led to the development of positive gender policies and programs in a number of the churches in Papua New Guinea (Anderson 2012, 2015a, 2015b). Overall, six of the top seven churches in our highlands field sites are involved in providing services, such as education and health, and, thus, do not eschew engagement in development projects as do some of the more fundamentalist churches.

The communities where the research was undertaken, despite their problems, possess considerable social capital, largely built up by community-based organisations, such as Voice for Change, KGWAN, IRRM and the churches. Local organisations and churches with such track records should always be the starting point for any community-based gender transformative programs. In Chimbu, the Catholic Church has been at the forefront of addressing witchcraft-related accusations and violence (Gibbs 2015). This willingness to address violence suggests that violence against women may also be taken up. Some churches are already fostering more egalitarian attitudes towards women in declaring that submission is to be embraced by both spouses in a marriage (see above, p. 7).

One initiative that holds some promise as a starting point for the changing of community norms is the development of community laws. This has been done in some communities in Jiwaka, encouraged by Voice for Change (Eves 2017b), and in Chimbu (Bal 2015). The development of community laws, as a response to some of the social issues and challenges faced by communities, has been fostered by the Government of Papua New Guinea and
has its legal basis in The Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments (Consolidated to No. 29 of 1998). The community laws developed in Jiwaka target a range of socially detrimental issues, such as polygamy, domestic violence, witchcraft accusations, theft and violence against children. One group, the Dambex Association of Kudjip, refers to their laws as the ‘Kuma Community Peace and Security Law’ and sets out a list of 30 ‘laws’ that members of the community must follow, including laws against polygyny, violence against women and marital rape. These laws also standardise bride price and forbid men from beating their spouse and demanding money, as well as requiring a man to divide up his money and goods equitably in his family. However, the evidence base to assess the utility and effectiveness of such initiatives is limited and there is clearly a need for more research into whether these initiatives have been successful and whether they can be scaled up in other places where high levels of violence and coercion exist. Given that these are community based initiatives inclusive of all members of the community, encouraging the adoption of such laws provides an opportunity to start conversations about gender transformation.

**Key Lesson — Women’s Economic Empowerment Programming Needs to Adopt a ‘Do No Harm’ Approach.**

Women’s economic advancement and empowerment sometimes has negative consequences for women (Eves 2016c; Eves and Crawford 2014; see p. 2). One of these negative consequences can be violence, and another that is widely felt is inequitable workloads. Many of the women interviewed during the PNG research endure a double work burden which impacts on their security, health and well-being, leaving them exhausted and in some cases ill. Add to this the male withdrawal of financial contributions to the household, and clearly it is essential for women’s economic empowerment programming to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach that does not risk exposing women to violence.

The importance of addressing violence in the context of women’s economic empowerment interventions has been especially highlighted recently in the international literature. Indeed, a recent DFID Guidance Note argues that programs to improve women’s business performance or increase women’s income are threatened or diluted by the impact of violence. To defuse the risk and to optimise benefits of economic development, the authors argue that it is essential for programs focusing on women’s business performance, or increasing women’s income, to address violence against women (Taylor 2015:5). The author suggests that an approach to improve women’s access to, and control over, assets and income combined with social interventions have consistently stronger and more positive outcomes than interventions that focus on economic factors alone (ibid.:8). The guidance note concludes that an effort to tackle violence against women that addresses social and gender norms will have an improved impact on women’s economic empowerment. The note suggests that ‘women’s lack of agency, assets and economic opportunities and their unpaid reproductive, household and caring responsibilities can compound discriminatory social norms and vastly increase their vulnerability to violence in many countries’ (ibid.:5).

To ensure that women’s economic empowerment programming mitigates risks of harm to women, holistic approaches are advocated. According to Taylor, economic advancement needs to be:

> implemented alongside, and integrated into, an approach that can increase women’s power and agency with respect to income and assets. This usually means an approach that will work to change social norms concerning women working, earning an income and having decision-making power (2015:19).

For this to be effective, specific action to address social norms and behaviour concerning violence, gender roles and gender relations and to ensure prevention, protection and response is needed (Taylor 2015:19–20).

Further, a sound ‘do no harm’ approach must be based on a thorough understanding of the situation, so that the risk of violence is not increased due to women’s increased income. This requires a thorough assessment of social
norms and support systems in regard to women’s work and income earning (Taylor et al. 2015:20). ‘Strategies that appear to be effective in one socio-cultural context may not be transferable to other contexts: they always need to be tested and monitored’ (Hunt and Kasynathan 2001:49). These observations are borne out by the DNH research, which points to a highly specific relationship between women’s economic advancement and violence in Papua New Guinea. Rather than relying on programming imported from other contexts, the DNH research points to the need for bespoke programming, which recognises the subtle and indirect aspects of the relationship between women’s economic advancement and violence.

This DNH research has provided insights into the gendered power dynamics at play in marital relationships, the specific factors that impede women’s income generating activities and their economic advancement, and the risk factors for violence in the PNG Highlands. Given the importance placed on women’s economic empowerment by donors, NGOs and governments, a critical need exists for research that provides a good understanding of the challenges to realising this goal and an evidence base from which development programming can proceed.
Endnotes

1. Besides the interviews with women, interviews were undertaken with men (112) and key informants, both male and female (135).

2. Resources are the building blocks necessary for women to succeed and can exist at both individual and community levels. They include: human capital (such as education, skills, training); financial capital (such as loans, savings); social capital (such as networks, relationships in a community, mentors); physical capital (such as land, machinery, tools, inventory) (Golla et al. 2011:4).

3. Thirty interviews were also undertaken with employed women (19) and men (11) in the urban centres of Goroka, Buka and Port Moresby but this data has not been discussed in this report. Future writings will document the issues that confronting women who have formal employment.

4. To provide an understanding of the context for the research, key informant interviews were undertaken with selected community members, including village leaders, church leaders, village court officials and women’s group leaders. Rather than using a specific questionnaire, unstructured interviews were undertaken using a topic guide.

5. The name KGWAN derives from three constituent clans — Kuniku, Genekane and Wandike. IRRM stands for Individual Reform and Restoration Movement.

6. According to the OECD, the ‘informal sector is broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned’ (2007:389). Those in the informal sector operate without the oversight of the state. The informal sector represents a significant portion of the economy, particularly in rural PNG, where 85 per cent of the population live.

7. As the DNH research is qualitative in scope, the figures presented here and elsewhere in the report and are not based on random sampling and thus are not generalisable. The figures are merely presented to give the reader insight into respondents’ background history and circumstances.

8. The exchange rate at 30 April 2016 was 1 K = AUD0.418082 or 1 AUD = K2.392303.

9. One bride price payment included a cow and some included a cassowary. Three bride price payments included from one to two goats and one included three sheep.

10. While quantitative studies have their particular merits, they are generally unable to attend to individual women’s voices, which are often obscured or unheard in such studies. The qualitative research presented here provides a far more nuanced appreciation of the dynamics at play as women struggle to bring income into the household than can be readily achieved in a generalisable quantitative study.

11. The focus of this report is on women and future writings will examine issues of violence and masculinity.

12. The GII measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development: reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and the proportion of adult females to males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status, expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older. Papua New Guinea also have ranks 158 out of the 188 countries in ‘human development’, recorded for 2014 (UNDP 2015a:256).

13. Some churches are articulating less hierarchical notions of gender using a poster that reworks the familiar biblical story of Adam’s rib. For example, the story of God using Adam’s rib bone to create Eve, the first
woman, has in the past been used to explain woman’s inferior position, but this poster points out that the rib having come from the man’s side shows that women and men should stand equally, side-by-side.

_Woman was created from the rib of man, not from his head to be above him nor his feet to be walked upon but from his side to be equal, near his arm to be protected, and close to his heart to be loved._

While the poster still privileges men, since woman depends on man for her very existence, it does counter the more usual conception of women being below men in the hierarchy, or being a ‘door mat’, as I heard it expressed elsewhere in PNG (Eves 2012:9). I have seen this poster in a Pentecostal church in New Ireland and being used by the Catholic Church in Western Province to promote more equitable gender relations.

Speaking of the Kewa of the Southern Highlands, Lisette Josephides refines this view, saying that these changes are giving rise to a comparative lessening of male power in relation to women which sees women slipping from men’s grasp (1994:187). She suggests that some of the violence women are subject to is motivated by fear because of the resultant weakening of men’s ability to control women (ibid.:190). Cyndi Banks suggests that men’s violence against women arises mostly when men perceive that they have lost control over women, or when women are believed to have breached expectations of conduct (Banks 2000:95; 1997). However, this should not be taken to suggest that violence against women is a product only of the contemporary world; there is considerable evidence to show that it pre-dates colonial contact.

This meant that in some places women were secluded in huts while they menstruated or gave birth. A key informant in Jiwaka said that it was forbidden for women who were menstruating to give cooked food to a man for if he ate such food he would be sick, not grow properly, not think clearly, his body would be skin and bones and he would die prematurely. He also said that today people are not fearful of menstruation or women who are pregnant or who have given birth and do not follow the strictures of avoidance. He even said that men obtain some kind of medicine from health centres and hospitals which means that they can safely sleep with their wives after they have given birth.

Many negative labels have been applied to women in the highlands, highlighting their roles as labourers and as useful assets for the creation of wealth which men control. For example, Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi has written that men have variously portrayed women as men’s ‘hands’, ‘trade stores’, ‘tractors’ and ‘capital assets’ (1997:541).

The age profile comprised five in their twenties (24, 2 at 27, 2 at 29), 12 in their thirties (2 at 30, 31, 33, 34, 4 at 35, 3 at 38), 10 in their forties (4 at 40, 41, 2 at 42, 2 at 44, 47), six in their fifties (2 at 50, 51, 52, 2 at 58) and two in their sixties (61, 67).

Savings groups do not appear to be common in Papua New Guinea though, during the DNH research in Bougainville, we came across some examples of informal ROSCAs (rotating savings and credit associations), sometimes referred to as Sande groups (Banthia et al. 2013:9, 36).

For example, in one model of savings group, promoted by IWDA and Live and Learn (a Solomon Islands NGO), membership costs SBD5, and an additional SBD for a passbook. The savings group has a general savings account (called the revolving or general fund) and individual savings accounts. For the first six months of her membership, a woman is permitted only to save and cannot borrow from the general savings account. To obtain a loan, a member must to apply to the executive of the club, showing that the loan will be used for a purpose that fits the club’s agreed loans policy. This could be for income generation or family needs (such as school or health centre fees). Loans can be no more than 80 per cent of the amount held in a member’s personal savings account, so that if she defaults on repayment, the club can use her savings to repay the loan (Brislane 2014:19). The savings club’s funds are deposited in a bank, if one is accessible, or locked in a strong box, which usually has two or three locks, each key being held by a member of the club’s executive.
Although it did not arise in our research, the community survey undertaken by Voice for Change showed that drunken men destroying women’s market stalls and stealing their money was considered the third most serious form of violence against women (Voice for Change 2013:30, 38–39).

There is a double-standard here, for although increasing numbers of men do not conform to the norm that they should perform particular types of agricultural labour, they suffer no sanctions or retribution.

Sometimes these indicators focus on a narrow category, such as ‘household decision-making’, which includes: 1) input into productive decisions, and 2) input into other household decisions (Bishop and Bowman 2014:259). Sometimes the indicators focus more broadly on the ‘ability to make decisions and influence’, which includes: 1) involvement in household investment decisions, 2) involvement in livelihood management decisions, 3) involvement in income-spending decisions, 4) involvement in general decisions, and 5) degree of influence in community decision-making (ibid.:261).

23 She is now a widow, as her husband, on his way back from Lae, was robbed and killed.

24 During other research with coffee smallholders, we sometimes heard coffee income referred to as ‘heavy money (hevi moni)’, meaning that coffee produces a substantial sum (Eves and Titus n.d.).

25 Reay’s work indicates that the women in Jiwaka were historically treated harshly by their husbands, leading Francesca Merlan to remark that ‘Overall, Reay harboured a view of women in the Wahgi as subject to regular disparagement and male violence’ (2014:xxviii). This is evident in statements by Reay such as, ‘[m]ale dominance is manifest in every institutional context’ and the ‘ritual and mundane life of the Kuma community expresses a deep-rooted antagonism between the sexes’ (1959:23).

26 Despite this local designation, polygyny can involve more than two wives.

27 Reay notes that for the clan she knew best, with 87 men, only 26.6 per cent of married had more than one wife each, but that at least 38 per cent of men over 35 years of age at that time were known to have been polygynous at some time. Only 35 per cent of these men had retained all their wives (Reay 1959:84–85).

28 The Marriage Act 1963 specifies the marriageable age is 18 years for a male and 16 for female. According to a report in the Post-Courier (23/8/2016), changes were ready to be implemented in 2016 to bring the Marriage Act into line with the Lukautim Pikinini Act 2015, so that the marriageable age for females would be 18. However, consultation with the PNG parliament website has been unable to find any indication that this change was made.

29 Respondents in Jiwaka mistakenly thought that King Solomon had only 300 wives, whereas according to First Kings 11:3 he ‘had seven hundred wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines’.

30 The man is infertile and so none of his wives have borne children, but some have had relationships with other men and had children as a result. The polygynous husband took these other men to court, gained compensation from them and has taken the children as his own.

31 Elsewhere in the highlands, I heard that a woman may get her husband to marry a younger sister, especially if she is tired of having sex with her husband.

32 As an indication of the hostility that often exists between co-wives, people sometimes refer to a co-wife as a ‘meri birua’, which means female enemy. Reay reported from her time in the Wahgi Valley that women did not accept docilely the double standard of sexual morality (1959:82) and that few ‘women submitted without complaining when their husbands took new wives’ (2014:9, 13).

33 In the past, according to Reay, the quality of the relationship between co-wives depended more on their clans of origin than on personal compatibilities. She says that a senior wife is more amicably disposed towards a co-wife who comes from the same clan but can be extremely hostile if she comes from a clan that was a
traditional enemy, giving an example of a pitched battle in which limbs were bruised and heads bloodied (1959:80–81).

34 This also demonstrates how wealthy a man is. Indeed, Reay remarks that the ‘simplest index of wealth is the size and number of houses a man builds for his wives. Only a wealthy man has more than two wives, and he builds each of their houses to accommodate from fifteen to thirty pigs’ (1959:95).

35 These are found in the mountains and traded to the Wahgi Valley (Reay 1959:6).

36 Though there has always been a dimension of property in the items exchanged at marriage. These construed women, according to Reay, as one category of valuables that were exchanged (1959:23). Where the situation differs today perhaps is that in response to increasing talk about women’s rights, men are emphasising more the property aspect of marriage exchanges.

37 The bride price is actually paid by the husband’s group — that is, by his sub-clan. In three cases it was unclear.

38 Alcohol has also been a contributor to violence in the other DNH research (see Eves 2016a; Eves 2018; Eves and Lusby 2018; Eves and Titus n.d.).

39 This is, however, not new and Reay writes of husbands and wives being ‘mutually jealous and antagonistic’, with husbands accusing their wives of being interested in other men (as well as being deliberately childless) (1959:82).

40 The WHO considers restricting access to financial resources a form of economic abuse that constitutes controlling behaviour (WHO 2012:1, see endnote 3), but some literature uses a far wider definition of economic abuse than the WHO. Mainly, the issue of what constitutes economic abuse is widely discussed only with reference to developed countries and so the examples are not always applicable to developing countries. A Scale of Economic Abuse has been developed, which lists a diversity of forms of this abuse under two broad headings — economic control and economic exploitation (Adams et al. 2008; see also Fawole 2008; Postmus et al. 2012; Sharp-Jeffs 2015; Jury et al. 2017).

41 Mayoux cites an example from Zimbabwe and Niger, where the men were quite explicit about valuing women’s increased income, since it freed them from some of their responsibility (1999b:972).

42 One key informant bemoaned the fact that when a man gets a large amount of income from coffee, he will start thinking about getting another wife and will use the money to seduce a woman (‘grism ol’).

43 The age profile comprised six in their twenties (22, 2 at 23, 26, 28, 29), 14 in the thirties (2 at 30, 2 at 31, 2 at 32, 33, 34, 3 at 35, 2 at 38, 39), five in their forties (41, 44, 45, 48, 49), two in their fifties (53, 55) and one in their sixties (60). One woman did not know her age.

44 The age profile comprised seven in their twenties (20, 22, 23, 3 at 24, 25), nine in their thirties (31, 3 at 32, 34, 2 at 35, 37, 38), seven in their forties (40, 44, 4 at 45, 49), three in their fifties (51, 54, 55).

45 For site 1, 28 of 29 women had children, with the numbers ranging from one to six, and nine of the women also had other dependants apart from their own children, with the number ranging from one to three. The total number of children was 87 and the total number of dependants was 14. For site 2, 23 of 26 had children, with the numbers ranging from one to eight, and nine of the women also have other dependants apart from their own children, with the number ranging from one to five. The total number of children was 72 and the total number of dependants was 18.

46 For site 1, 26 women were married and three separated/divorced/abandoned. There was one polygynous marriage and eight women had been married previously. For site 2, 23 women were married and three separated/divorced/abandoned. There were no polygynous marriages and four women had been married previously.
47 For site 1, 23 of 29 marriages entailed the exchange of bride price. The largest bride price was K4000 and fifteen pigs and the smallest was K300. The highest monetary amount was K4000 and the lowest was K200. The largest number of pigs was 15 and the lowest number was three. Two bride price exchanges did not involve pigs and two involved the exchange of one goat. For site 2, 20 of 26 entailed the exchange of bride price. The largest bride price was K3500, 15 pigs and three sheep and the smallest was K400 and one pig. All bride price payments involved the exchange of pigs with the largest number being 15 and the lowest one. One bride payment involved the exchange of three sheep and one the exchange of two goats.

48 The educational level for site 1 were: six had no formal education; 10 had attended primary school; 12 had attended secondary school (including one who undertook vocational training) and one had attended a tertiary institution (teacher training). For site 2: nine had no formal education; 13 had attended primary school and four had attended secondary school.

49 For site 1, church affiliation was as follows: 15 Catholic Church; six Revival Centres of Papua New Guinea; two Lutheran Church; one Assemblies of God; two Christian Outreach Centre; one Evangelical Brotherhood Church; one Four Square Gospel; one Baptist Church. For site 2, church affiliation was as follows: 12 Catholic Church; four Lutheran Church; four Seventh Day Adventist; one Revival Centres of PNG; one Evangelical Brotherhood Church; one Christian Outreach Centre; one Nazarene Church; one Christian Life Centre and one New Government Revival.

50 For site 1, eight women had their own bank account, one of these indicating she also has a joint account with her husband. One woman used her sister's account. Thirteen women had mobile phones. For site 2, only five women had their own bank account. One woman used another person's account, one used her husband's and three used the IRRM account. Seven women had mobile phones.

51 Due to the altitude, coffee does not grow in this part of the province.

52 Some men travel further afield taking bags of onions to Mt Hagen, Goroka, Madang and Lae.

53 The costs of transport from each of the research sites: K5 per bag of produce to the road; road to Kundiawa K10; cost of carrier from vehicle to market K2 per bag. The cost of access to the market is K5–6 per bag.

54 When I first visited Gembogl for some other research in 2006 (see Eves 2006), the road had been blocked for 11 months by a huge boulder. During the DNH research at the first research site close to Gembogl, a huge landslide covered the road and stranded our hire vehicle for over a week.

55 This suggests some variability within the Catholic Church when resorting to the notion of the husband being head of the household. The evidence from Chimbu is that the notion of mutual submission of husband and wife was less common (see endnote 13) than the notion of the husband ruling the wife.

56 Possibly it was related to his infidelity and the fact that he had a relationship with another woman and had a child with her.

57 Though, as one insightful respondent said, some women are forced into sex with their husbands under economic duress. If they agree to sex, their husbands, who are in control of the money, will give some to their wife. So, women who do not have a truly independent source of income are being coerced into unwanted sex with their husbands.

58 There have also been cases in the last decade of both women and men being accused of witchcraft (sanguma in Tok Pisin or kumo in the vernacular) and killed or expelled, both in the communities where the research was undertaken and in nearby communities in the LLG. During our fieldwork, there were two deaths in the community which led to speculation about who might have been the cause, though in these cases those accused were not physically attacked. In one case, after a death, a young man who was drunk started making
accusations in the mourning house (haus krai). He was chased out of the house by angry mourners and fell into the fast-flowing Chimbu River and drowned.

IRRM has endeavoured to promote access to larger markets by buying produce (in this case brown onions), but has not always been successful. For example, in 2014 IRRM purchased 4000 (35 kg) bags of onions from local producers but was unable to sell them at sufficient price to recover the initial cost of K55,000. IRRM posted to Facebook about the difficulties of selling onions and a buyer in Alotau purchased 6.25 tonnes for a supermarket there, but overall, IRRM recovered only K20,000.

This observation has been widely made in the women’s economic empowerment literature, numerous scholars having noted that women’s increased income often comes at the ‘cost of heavier work loads’ (Arku and Arku 2009:201, 208; Chant and Sweetman 2012:524; Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996:53; Kabeer 1999:453; 2001:71; Leach and Sitaram 2002:581; Mayoux 1999b:973). For example, Haile and colleagues argue that women’s involvement in a microfinance project leads to increased workloads largely because the traditional division of labour is perpetuated rather than challenged (2012:264).

Cases of changing masculinities do exist, showing men eschewing violence and acting in more positive ways towards women (see Eves 2016b, 2012; Gibbs 2016).

Our Bougainville research found that not one woman who experienced physical abuse reported it to the police (see Eves 2018).

Cases of rape are supposed to be referred to the police, but village courts sometimes act outside their jurisdiction, which we were told has occurred in Chimbu.

However, sometimes the police being ‘strong’ entails them handing out rough justice to accused perpetrators and key informants mentioned one senior officer in the region beating up perpetrators who beat their wives.

These initiatives initially focused on sexual and reproductive health and HIV (Carovano 1995; Foreman 1999; UNAIDS 2001). Considerable emphasis has been placed on working with men to end violence against women, both as a single issue (Barker 2001; Eves 2006; Flood 2001, 2002–3; Kaufman 2001; Medrado 2003) and within the context of HIV, because such violence and HIV have often been seen as interdependent epidemics (Barker and Ricardo 2005; Chege 2005; Eves 2010; Peacock and Levack 2004). There has been some focus on working with men more broadly in the relation to gender equality (Chant and Gutmann 2000; Cleaver 2002; Cornwall 2000; Correia and Bannon 2006; Esplen 2006; Eves 2009; UNDAW 2004), but the development of programs relevant to women’s economic empowerment have received less attention.

This is perhaps been best demonstrated by early models of HIV prevention which assumed that by providing information about AIDS to address knowledge deficits, people would engage in safe sex. Such a model has been found to be wanting and there has been a shift to community-based models of HIV prevention (see Beeker et al. 1998; Campbell and Comish 2010).

Developmental leadership, according to Heather de Ver, ‘is the process of organising or mobilising people and resources in pursuit of particular ends or goals, in given institutional contexts of authority, legitimacy and power’ (Ver 2009:9; see also Ver 2008; Leftwich and Hogg 2007).

Development practitioners use the term social capital as an analytic concept to describe the importance of social relationships and the willingness of people to work for the collective good of the community. ‘Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons’ (Coleman 1990:302) with an emphasis on strong interpersonal ties, such as kinship and intimate friendship (Putnam 1993:175). Some scholars have argued that social capital is an important prerequisite of effective sustainable development. Francis Fukuyama, for example, argues in his ‘Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda’, that shared norms and values that promote social cooperation are central to successful
development and economic growth. According to Fukuyama, social capital:

*directly affects the ability of people to organize for economic ends; it supports the creation of institutions and the rule of law; and is a vital underpinning of democracy, which is the source of legitimacy for the political framework in which development increasingly takes place* (Fukuyama 2002:27).

69 In a report prepared for AusAID, Rachel Stein-Holmes writes:

Religious organisations in PNG form a core institution of development. They work largely at the grass-roots level and are a key aspect of the civil society network. … *Because of their close involvement at the local level, church organisations are in a unique position as a representative of people’s interests, and as a provider of their needs. Church agencies are an essential component of civil society and can potentially work with aid agencies as a means for enhancing development … They serve as a crucial component of PNG civil society fabric.*

(Stein-Holmes 2003:10)

70 Voice for Change is working with communities to develop what are referred to as community peace and security laws.

71 It says that ‘subject to the Constitution, this Organic Law, and Provincial Government law, a Local-level Government may make laws on the following subject matters: (h) maintaining peace, good order and law through consultation, mediation, arbitration and community forums’.
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